سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها فلسفه تطبیقی 3041-9468 3 3 2026 11 22 Comparative Phenomenology of Nature in Sadraean Ontology and the Advaita Vedanta School پدیدارشناسی تطبیقی طبیعت در هستی‌شناسی صدرایی و مکتب ادویتا ودانته 1 14 741024 10.30487/cph.2026.2084173.1075 FA محمد شفیعی دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، قم، دانشگاه قم 0009-0006-2226-9678 مهدی منفرد دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه قم 0009-0006-1375-1788 Journal Article 2026 01 31 Abstract In the twentieth century, the rise of environmental challenges alongside the spread of philosophical phenomenology gave birth to eco-phenomenology—an approach that can serve in comparative philosophy as a key to cross-cultural convergence in confronting humanity's self-inflicted crises. The present study offers a comparative phenomenological analysis of nature in two Eastern philosophical traditions: Advaita Vedānta and Ṣadrian Transcendent Theosophy. The central research question is: what phenomenological relationship do these two ontological systems hold with respect to their understanding of nature? To this end, after elucidating the philosophical insights of Mullā Ṣadrā and the Advaita Vedānta school regarding nature, a comparative phenomenological analysis is presented. The aim is to analyze these two schools phenomenologically and thereby lay the groundwork for developing a cross-cultural philosophical framework for environmental ethics. The findings reveal that, despite their divergent origins, these two traditions share remarkable commonalities in fundamental principles such as belief in the unity of existence, emphasis on intuitive knowledge as the path to salvation, and the pursuit of absolute reality as the axis of being. Both schools reject a purely instrumental and materialistic view of nature and accord it intrinsic value. By linking humanity and nature to a transcendent reality, these ontological perspectives provide rich theoretical foundations for environmental ethics and can strengthen the motivation needed for environmental preservation and the transition beyond destructive modern attitudes. This study paves the way for deeper cross-cultural dialogues and the development of inter-civilizational environmental ethics. Introduction The growing ecological crises of the contemporary world—climate change, biodiversity loss, environmental degradation, and the exploitation of natural resources—have prompted urgent calls for philosophical reflection on the relationship between human beings and nature. In response to these challenges, the field of environmental ethics has emerged as a vital area of philosophical inquiry, seeking to articulate normative frameworks that can guide human action toward more sustainable and respectful engagement with the natural world. At the same time, the phenomenological method, with its emphasis on lived experience and the suspension of presuppositions, has offered new possibilities for understanding how human beings directly experience and interpret their environment. The convergence of these concerns has given rise to "ecophenomenology," a field that seeks to recover a more authentic and immediate experience of nature, free from the distorting lens of purely instrumental and scientific approaches. Within this context, comparative philosophy offers a promising avenue for enriching environmental ethics by drawing upon the wisdom traditions of non-Western cultures. The present study undertakes a comparative phenomenological analysis of nature as conceived in two major philosophical traditions: the transcendent philosophy (al-ḥikma al-muta'āliya) of Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635), the preeminent figure of Islamic philosophy, and the Advaita Vedānta school of Hindu philosophy, as articulated by its foundational thinker Śaṅkara (c. 8th century CE). Both traditions, despite their distinct cultural and historical origins, offer profound and sophisticated ontologies that challenge the reductive materialism and anthropocentrism that have come to dominate modern Western thought. The central research question guiding this study is: How can the phenomenological analysis of nature in the ontological frameworks of Mullā Ṣadrā and Advaita Vedānta be compared, and what are the implications of these frameworks for the development of a cross-cultural environmental ethics? The study argues that both philosophical systems, through their respective doctrines of the unity of existence, the dynamic and sacred character of nature, and the centrality of intuitive knowledge, provide robust theoretical foundations for an environmental ethic that recognizes the intrinsic value of nature and the profound interconnectedness of all beings. The significance of this research lies in its potential to bridge Eastern and Western philosophical traditions in service of a shared global concern—the protection and preservation of the natural environment. By identifying points of convergence between Islamic and Hindu thought on the nature of reality and the place of nature within it, the study contributes to the development of a genuinely intercultural environmental ethics that can draw upon the moral and spiritual resources of multiple traditions. This approach not only enriches philosophical understanding but also provides practical motivation for environmental stewardship, grounded in a deep appreciation of nature as a manifestation of the sacred. Research Methodology This research employs a comparative phenomenological methodology to analyze the ontological conception of nature in two philosophical traditions: Mullā Ṣadrā's transcendent philosophy and the Advaita Vedānta school of Hindu philosophy. The research proceeds through several systematic stages. The first stage involves a comprehensive exposition of each tradition's philosophical foundations regarding nature. For Mullā Ṣadrā, this includes examination of his core doctrines of the principiality of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), the gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), substantial motion (ḥaraka jawhariyya), and the concept of nature as a manifestation of divine names and attributes. Primary sources consulted include Ṣadrā's magnum opus al-Asfār al-arba'a (The Four Intellectual Journeys), his al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād (The Origin and the Return), and other key works. For Advaita Vedānta, the analysis focuses on Śaṅkara's commentaries on the principal Upaniṣads, the Brahma-sūtras, and the Bhagavad-gītā, as well as the foundational concepts of Brahman (ultimate reality), Ātman (the true self), and Māyā (the cosmic illusion or creative power). Secondary literature from both traditions is consulted for contextualization and clarification. The second stage involves comparative phenomenological analysis, examining the two traditions across four key thematic dimensions: (1) the ontological status of nature and its relationship to ultimate reality; (2) the epistemological methods for attaining knowledge of nature's true nature; (3) the teleological orientation of the spiritual journey and the role of nature within it; and (4) the implications of each ontology for environmental ethics and practice. This analysis identifies both convergences and divergences between the two frameworks, using phenomenological concepts such as intentionality, lived experience, and the bracketing of presuppositions as analytical tools. The third stage synthesizes the findings and draws implications for the development of a cross-cultural environmental ethics. The research employs a hermeneutical approach, interpreting the philosophical texts not merely as historical artifacts but as living resources that can speak to contemporary concerns. Throughout the analysis, the study maintains a balanced approach, neither forcing the traditions into artificial agreement nor exaggerating their differences, but allowing each to speak in its own voice while identifying genuine points of resonance and complementarity. Discussion Mullā Ṣadrā's Ontology: Nature as a Dynamic and Sacred Order Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system is founded upon the principle of the principiality of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), which marks a decisive departure from the earlier Islamic philosophical emphasis on quiddity (māhiyya). According to this doctrine, existence is the sole genuine reality in the external world; quiddities are merely conceptual limitations that the mind imposes upon existence. Existence is not a static, uniform reality but a graded, dynamic continuum that extends from the necessary existence of God, through the various levels of contingent existence, down to the lowest degree—material nature. This gradation (tashkīk) means that all beings participate in the same reality of existence but to different degrees, much as light admits of varying intensities while remaining essentially light. Within this graded ontological framework, nature occupies the lowest level of existence, characterized by materiality, change, and potentiality. However, this does not mean that nature is insignificant or illusory. On the contrary, as a genuine mode of existence, nature is a real manifestation of the divine reality. In Ṣadrā's conception, which is often interpreted through the lens of "gradational unity of existence" (waḥdat al-wujūd al-tashkīkiyya), all beings are interconnected within a single continuum of existence. Even in the more radical interpretation of "personal unity of existence" (waḥdat al-wujūd al-shakhṣiyya), nature is not dismissed as mere illusion but understood as a manifestation (ẓuhūr) and appearance of the one reality. Thus, while nature may be the lowest level of existence, it is by no means divorced from the higher levels; rather, it participates in and reflects the same fundamental reality. A second cornerstone of Ṣadrā's ontology is his doctrine of substantial motion (ḥaraka jawhariyya). Traditional Aristotelian philosophy had limited change to the category of accidents—the qualities and attributes of substances could change, but substances themselves remained fixed. Ṣadrā radically transformed this view by asserting that change penetrates the very substance of things; the essence of a being is itself in a state of continuous becoming and transformation. Nature, on this view, is not a static collection of inert objects but a dynamic process of perpetual self-transformation toward ever higher degrees of perfection. Every natural entity—from minerals to plants, animals, and humans—is engaged in an ongoing journey of becoming, moving from potentiality to actuality, from lower to higher levels of existence. This understanding imbues nature with a sacred, purposeful character; it is not a mere resource to be exploited but a living, evolving manifestation of divine wisdom. Third, Ṣadrā interprets nature as a mirror reflecting the divine names and attributes. According to this view, every natural phenomenon is a sign (āya) of God, a locus of divine manifestation (tajallī). The beauty, order, and complexity of the natural world are not accidental features but expressions of the divine beauty, order, and wisdom. To contemplate nature is to contemplate the divine; to respect nature is to respect the divine presence that manifests through it. This understanding transforms the human relationship with nature from one of domination and exploitation to one of reverence, gratitude, and responsibility. Nature is not an alien other to be conquered but a sacred text to be read and understood. Fourth, Ṣadrā's anthropology situates human beings within this cosmic order as the most comprehensive manifestation of the divine names. Human beings are not external to nature but emerge from it and remain deeply connected to it. The human soul, according to Ṣadrā's doctrine of "the bodily origination and spiritual subsistence of the soul" (ḥudūth jismānī wa baqā' rūḥānī), is initially generated within the material body but through its spiritual development can transcend the limitations of materiality. The perfection of the human being requires the perfection of the body and the proper engagement with the material world. Thus, nature serves as the necessary arena for human spiritual development; it is the "crucible of spiritual perfection." The human being, as God's vicegerent (khalīfa), bears a profound responsibility to care for nature and to maintain its balance and integrity. Advaita Vedānta: Nature as the Veil of Brahman Advaita Vedānta, as articulated by Śaṅkara, presents a non-dualistic ontology in which Brahman—the ultimate, infinite, and unchanging reality—is the sole true existent. The phenomenal world, including what we call nature, is not ultimately real but is a product of Māyā, a cosmic power or creative force that both conceals the true nature of Brahman and projects the appearance of multiplicity and differentiation. The concept of Māyā is central to understanding the Advaitic view of nature. Māyā is a complex and nuanced concept with multiple levels of meaning. In its earliest Vedic usage, it signified "extraordinary power" or "creative ability." In Advaita Vedānta, it takes on the sense of "that which is not" (in the sense of being non-ultimately real) or the cosmic illusion that creates the appearance of a world separate from Brahman. Māyā is described as "neither real nor unreal" (sadasadvilakṣaṇa); it is not real because it does not persist through all states of consciousness, but it is not completely unreal because it is experienced. The world of nature, as perceived through ordinary consciousness, is a construction of Māyā, a superimposition on the underlying reality of Brahman. This does not mean that nature is entirely unreal in the sense of being non-existent; rather, it is not ultimately real. It has a pragmatic reality (vyāvahārika-sattā) that allows it to function as a sphere of action and experience, but it lacks transcendental reality (pāramārthika-sattā). The distinction is analogous to the difference between a dream and waking consciousness: the dream is experienced and has a kind of reality while it lasts, but upon waking, one recognizes it as a mere projection of the mind. Similarly, upon attaining true knowledge (vidyā), the Advaitin recognizes the phenomenal world as a projection of ignorance (avidyā) and realizes the non-dual nature of reality. Śaṅkara illustrates the concept of Māyā through familiar examples of perceptual error: mistaking a rope for a snake, or a piece of mother-of-pearl for silver. In these cases, the perceived object (the snake or silver) is not completely real (there is no snake or silver present), but the perception is not completely unreal either (there is something present that is perceived erroneously). The error arises from ignorance—a failure to recognize the true nature of what is actually present. Similarly, our perception of a multiplicity of objects in nature arises from ignorance of the underlying unity of Brahman. When the veil of ignorance is removed through knowledge, the apparent multiplicity dissolves into the unity of Brahman. The Advaitic view of nature thus presents a profound epistemological and ethical challenge. If nature is ultimately an illusion, why should we care for it? Why protect what is ultimately unreal? The Advaitic response to this challenge is subtle and nuanced. First, the Advaitic path to liberation (mokṣa) is not a rejection of the world in a nihilistic sense but a transcendence of attachment to the world. The Advaitin seeks to realize the unity of all beings in Brahman, and this realization entails a deep respect for all manifestations of the one reality. Second, Śaṅkara emphasizes the importance of karma (action) and dharma (righteousness) in the stage of preparation for knowledge. Ethical action in the world, including care for nature, is a necessary part of the spiritual path, even if the ultimate goal transcends the world. Third, the Advaitic emphasis on the unity of all beings implies an ethic of non-harm (ahiṃsā) and compassion that extends to all living beings, recognizing the same divine presence in all. Comparative Phenomenological Analysis: Convergences and Divergences The comparative phenomenological analysis reveals both significant convergences and important divergences between the two ontological frameworks. First, regarding the unity of existence, both traditions affirm a fundamental unity underlying the apparent multiplicity of the world. For Ṣadrā, this unity takes the form of a graded continuum of existence in which all beings participate to varying degrees; for Śaṅkara, it is an absolute non-duality in which Brahman alone is real and all multiplicity is ultimately illusory. Despite this difference, both traditions reject the atomistic, reductive materialism that characterizes much modern Western thought and affirm the essential unity and interconnectedness of all things. The metaphors employed by both traditions—shadow, reflection, manifestation, dream—are strikingly similar, suggesting a common phenomenological insight into the relationship between the ultimate and the apparent. Second, regarding the epistemic method for grasping ultimate reality, both traditions emphasize the centrality of intuitive, experiential, and transformative knowledge. Ordinary sensory perception and rational argument are recognized as necessary but ultimately insufficient for attaining true understanding. Both traditions point to a form of direct, non-discursive, and transformative intuition (shuhūd in Islamic mysticism; jñāna in Advaita) that transcends the limitations of ordinary knowing and brings the aspirant into direct contact with ultimate reality. This emphasis on experiential knowledge is consistent with the phenomenological emphasis on lived experience and the bracketing of theoretical presuppositions. Third, regarding the goal of the spiritual journey, both traditions define liberation or perfection in terms of the realization of one's true nature and the overcoming of ignorance. For Ṣadrā, human perfection consists in becoming a "rational world" that reflects all the truths of existence, ultimately attaining union with the divine. For Śaṅkara, liberation consists in the realization of one's identity with Brahman and the dissolution of the illusion of separateness. In both traditions, nature serves as the arena or pathway for this spiritual journey; it is not to be rejected but to be understood, respected, and ultimately transcended. Fourth, regarding the ethical implications for environmental ethics, both traditions provide robust foundations for an ethics of respect and care for nature. Although Advaita Vedānta views nature as ultimately illusory, its emphasis on unity, non-harm, and compassion, combined with its recognition of the world as a legitimate sphere of ethical action, supports an environmental ethic that recognizes the intrinsic value of all beings. Ṣadrā's emphasis on nature as a divine manifestation, a mirror of divine names and attributes, and the necessary arena for spiritual development provides an even more direct foundation for environmental stewardship. Both traditions reject the purely instrumental view of nature characteristic of modern Western thought and affirm the sacred dimension of the natural world. The principal divergence between the two traditions lies in their respective assessments of nature's ontological status. For Ṣadrā, nature is genuinely real, though ontologically inferior to higher levels of existence; for Śaṅkara, nature is pragmatically real but ultimately illusory. This difference has practical implications: Ṣadrā's view provides a more straightforward basis for environmental activism, while Advaita's view demands a more subtle integration of engagement with the world and detachment from it. However, both views can and do support an environmental ethic, grounded in respect for the divine presence in all things. Conclusion This comparative phenomenological study of nature in Mullā Ṣadrā's transcendent philosophy and Advaita Vedānta has revealed significant convergences between these two Eastern ontological traditions, with important implications for the development of a cross-cultural environmental ethics. The analysis has identified four key areas of resonance. First, both traditions affirm the fundamental unity of existence, rejecting the reductive materialism and atomism that have come to dominate modern Western thought. Nature, in both frameworks, is not a collection of inert objects but a manifestation of a single, sacred reality. Second, both emphasize the centrality of intuitive, experiential knowledge as the path to true understanding. Ordinary sensory perception and rational argument are necessary but insufficient; authentic knowledge requires a transformative, direct encounter with reality. Third, nature serves as the arena or pathway for spiritual development in both traditions; it is not to be rejected but to be engaged with wisely and respectfully as a means of attaining ultimate perfection. Fourth, both traditions provide robust foundations for an environmental ethics that rejects the purely instrumental view of nature, recognizing the intrinsic value and sacred character of the natural world. While the two traditions differ in their assessment of nature's ontological status—Ṣadrā affirming the genuine reality of nature (though at the lowest level of existence) and Śaṅkara regarding nature as ultimately illusory—both can and do support an ethic of respect, care, and stewardship. Ṣadrā's view provides a more direct ontological basis for environmental activism, while Advaita's view demands a more subtle integration of engagement and detachment. However, the practical implications of both frameworks converge in their rejection of exploitation and their affirmation of the sacred character of the natural world. These findings suggest that the philosophical resources of Eastern traditions can make a vital contribution to the development of a genuinely intercultural environmental ethics. By drawing upon the wisdom of Islamic and Hindu thought, we can articulate ethical frameworks that are not only philosophically sound but also spiritually motivating, grounded in a deep appreciation of nature as a manifestation of the divine. This approach offers a powerful alternative to the purely utilitarian and economic rationales that have proven insufficient to address the ecological crises of our time. Future research might extend this comparative analysis to include other Eastern and Western traditions, exploring the practical implications of these ontologies for environmental policy, education, and practice. در قرن بیستم، با ظهور چالش‌های زیست محیطی از یک سو و رواج روش پدیدارشناسی فلسفی از سوی دیگر، مفهوم اکوفنومنولوژی (پدیدارشناسی محیط زیست) متولد شد. امری که می‌تواند در فلسفه تطبیقی، به مثابه کلید همفکری و همگرایی بینافرهنگی‌ برای مواجهه با مصائب خودساخته بشر مورد توجه قرار گیرد. تحقیق پیش رو به بررسی تطبیقی دو سنت فلسفی ادویتا ودانته و حکمت متعالیه صدرایی درباره طبیعت، مبتنی بر روش پدیدارشناسی، پرداخته است. پرسش اصلی پژوهش آن است که این دو نظام هستی‌شناختی در تلقی از طبیعت، چه نسبت پدیدارشناسانه‌ای با یکدیگر دارند؟ در این راستا، پس از تبیین بینش فلسفی ملاصدرا و مکتب ادویتا ودانته درباره طبیعت، تحلیل تطبیقی پدیدارشناختی ارائه شده است. هدف این تحقیق، تحلیل پدیدارشناختی این دو مکتب و فایده آن، ایجاد زمینه‌ای برای تدوین چارچوب فلسفی بینافرهنگی در اخلاق زیست‌محیطی است. یافته‌های تحقیق نشان می‌دهد که این دو مکتب به رغم خاستگاه‌های متفاوت، در اصول بنیادینی همچون اعتقاد به وحدت وجود، تأکید بر معرفت شهودی به عنوان راه رستگاری، و هدف‌گیریِ شناخت حقیقت مطلق به عنوان محور هستی، اشتراکات چشمگیری دارند. هر دو مکتب، نگرش صرفاً ابزاری و مادی‌گرایانه به طبیعت را رد کرده و برای آن ارزشی ذاتی قائل هستند. این دیدگاه‌های هستی‌شناختی، با پیوند دادن انسان و طبیعت به حقیقت متعالی، پشتوانه‌های نظری غنی برای اخلاق زیست‌محیطی فراهم می‌کنند و می‌توانند انگیزه لازم برای حفاظت از محیط زیست و گذار از نگرش‌های مخرب مدرن را تقویت کنند. این پژوهش زمینه را برای گفت‌وگوهای بینافرهنگی عمیق‌تر و توسعه اخلاق زیست‌محیطی بیناتمدنی فراهم می‌سازد.

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سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها فلسفه تطبیقی 3041-9468 3 3 2026 11 22 Criticism of the Ethical Foundations of Carl Rogers's Client-Centered Theory from the Perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi نقد مبانی اخلاقی نظریه مراجع‌محوری کارل راجرز از منظر آیت‌الله مصباح یزدی 15 34 740972 10.30487/cph.2026.2081372.1070 FA امیر قربان پور لفمجانی گروه علوم تربیتی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران 0000-0003-3548-5629 Journal Article 2025 12 19 Abstract Carl Rogers' person-centered theory, as a humanistic school of psychotherapy, centers on the concepts of "self-actualization" and "the actualizing tendency," proposing specific ethical foundations for the therapeutic relationship and human valuation. This article employs an analytical-comparative method to examine and critique these foundations from the ethical viewpoint of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a prominent representative of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy (al-hikmah al-muta‘āliyah) with an Islamic approach. The findings indicate that while Rogers' emphasis on client respect, unconditional empathy, and positive regard is also valued from an Islamic ethical perspective, the axiological foundations of his theory—particularly the ethical relativism stemming from the absolute authority of individual subjective experience, the organismic self-regulation, the absence of divine teleology for human beings, and the definition of the "self" as an autonomous entity inclined toward self-actualization apart from a relationship with God—are in fundamental conflict with Mesbah Yazdi's ethical framework. The latter is grounded in moral realism, the divine innate nature (fiṭrah) of humans, and the purposiveness of creation centered on servitude to God and spiritual proximity to Him. This critique not only reveals the philosophical shortcomings of Rogers' theory but also demonstrates the capacity of the Islamic ethical system to provide a more comprehensive framework for helping relationships—one that preserves human dignity while guiding individuals toward their true perfection. Introduction Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy, as one of the most influential humanistic approaches in modern psychotherapy, represents a significant paradigm shift in understanding the therapeutic relationship and human nature. Central to Rogers' theory are the concepts of "self-actualization" and the "actualizing tendency," which propose that human beings possess an innate drive toward growth, fulfillment, and the realization of their inherent potential. This framework establishes specific ethical foundations for the therapeutic relationship and human valuation, emphasizing unconditional positive regard, empathy, congruence, and the absolute authority of the client's subjective experience as the ultimate guide for decision-making and value assessment. Rogers' person-centered approach has been widely adopted in counseling and psychotherapy training centers worldwide, including in Iran. However, the increasing application of Western psychological theories in Islamic cultural contexts raises important questions about the compatibility of their underlying philosophical and ethical assumptions with Islamic moral frameworks. Despite Rogers' significant influence, the ethical foundations of his theory—particularly its axiological commitments regarding moral relativism, the nature of human flourishing, and the relationship between the individual and transcendent reality—have not been subjected to systematic philosophical critique from an Islamic ethical perspective, especially compared to other major theories such as Ellis's rational emotive behavior therapy or Freud's psychoanalysis. The present study addresses this gap by examining and critiquing the ethical foundations of Rogers' client-centered theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi (d. 2021), a prominent contemporary Islamic philosopher and representative of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy (al-hikmah al-muta'aliyah). Misbah Yazdi's ethical framework is grounded in moral realism, the divine innate nature (fiṭrah) of human beings, and the purposiveness of creation centered on servitude to God and spiritual proximity to the Divine. His comprehensive system integrates rational inquiry, scriptural revelation, and mystical insight to articulate a normative ethics that addresses both individual flourishing and social responsibility. The central research question guiding this inquiry is: What are the fundamental critiques that Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework offers against the axiological and ethical foundations of Rogers' client-centered theory, and how can this critique inform the development of culturally appropriate and ethically grounded approaches to psychotherapy in Islamic contexts? By engaging in this critical dialogue, the research seeks to clarify the points of convergence and divergence between humanistic psychology's emphasis on individual autonomy and Islamic ethics' commitment to divine teleology and moral objectivity. The findings aim to demonstrate both the philosophical shortcomings of Rogers' secular humanistic framework and the capacity of Islamic ethics to provide a more comprehensive foundation for helping relationships that preserves human dignity while guiding individuals toward their true perfection. Research Methodology This research employs a descriptive-analytical and critical methodology, situated within the framework of qualitative philosophical inquiry. The study proceeds in two distinct phases to systematically examine and critique the ethical foundations of Rogers' client-centered theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework. In the first phase, Rogers' axiological and ethical views were comprehensively extracted from primary and secondary sources using a library-based approach. Key texts examined include Rogers' major works, including On Becoming a Person (1961), Client-Centered Therapy (1951), and A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships (1959), as well as secondary commentaries and critical analyses. The collected materials were systematically organized around core themes including the locus of evaluation, the organismic valuing process, self-actualization, unconditional positive regard, and the nature of the autonomous self. In the second phase, Misbah Yazdi's ethical views were examined through his extensive corpus, including his multi-volume works Ethics in the Qur'an (1389/2010), The Philosophy of Ethics (1388/2009), Critique and Examination of Ethical Schools (1392/2013), and his pedagogical works on Islamic ethics and philosophy. His framework was systematically compared with Rogers' positions, with particular attention to fundamental categories such as the nature of moral knowledge, the source and objectivity of values, the teleology of human existence, the concept of human nature (fiṭrah), the relationship between reason and revelation, and the practical implications of each framework for the therapeutic relationship. The comparative analysis follows a critical approach, treating Rogers' theory not as an equal dialogue partner but as a secular framework to be evaluated against Islamic ethical principles. The method enables both identification of points of agreement—such as the value of empathy, respect for persons, and unconditional positive regard—and articulation of fundamental incompatibilities regarding moral relativism, the nature of human flourishing, and the relationship between human beings and the Divine. The study culminates in a practical comparison of the therapeutic implications of each ethical framework, presented through systematic tables that clarify the divergent goals, roles, and methods of secular humanistic versus Islamic faith-based counseling approaches. Discussion The Ethical Foundations of Rogers' Client-Centered Theory Rogers' client-centered theory is built upon several interconnected ethical and philosophical foundations that collectively constitute its distinctive axiological framework. The first and most fundamental principle is the absolute authority of subjective experience as the ultimate criterion for value judgment and moral decision-making. Rogers asserts that the "organismic experience" of each individual serves as the final arbiter of right and wrong, good and bad, and that no external authority—whether traditional morality, religion, cultural norms, or even the therapist—has the right to impose values upon the client. This principle establishes radical phenomenological subjectivism as the epistemological foundation of the theory, affirming that the only reality accessible to human beings is their own internal world of perceptions, feelings, and meanings. From this perspective, behavior is determined not by objective reality but by the individual's subjective perception of reality, and each person lives within their own unique and private phenomenal field. This commitment to phenomenology as both a method and an ontological stance leads inevitably to ethical relativism, as different individuals operating from different experiential worlds will inevitably arrive at different, equally valid moral judgments. The second ethical foundation is "organismic self-regulation as the basis of action", articulated through Rogers' concept of the "organismic valuing process." According to Rogers, human beings possess an innate, biological capacity to evaluate experiences and actions based on whether they promote or inhibit self-actualization. This process serves as a built-in guidance system that helps individuals distinguish between growth-enhancing and growth-inhibiting experiences, provided that the individual is free from the distorting influences of externally imposed "conditions of worth." The organismic valuing process is characterized as fluid, dynamic, and context-sensitive, operating through a continuous feedback mechanism wherein experiences are symbolized and evaluated according to the satisfaction they provide to the organism. Under optimal environmental conditions—characterized by unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding—this intrinsic valuing process enables individuals to make choices that genuinely serve their well-being and growth. The third ethical foundation is the "inherent tendency toward self-actualization" as the intrinsic moral direction of human life. Rogers posits that human beings are born with a fundamental drive toward growth, autonomy, and the full realization of their potential capacities. This actualizing tendency is presented as a universal, biologically-based characteristic of all living organisms, serving as the central motivating force behind all human activity. The actualizing tendency directs organisms toward the enhancement and preservation of self, guiding them toward greater complexity, integration, and fulfillment. From this perspective, ethical behavior is defined as behavior that aligns with this innate tendency and supports the organism's continued growth and development. The good is thus identified with what is growth-promoting for the individual, and evil with what obstructs or damages the organism's capacity for flourishing. This identification of the good with biological growth and psychological integration represents a form of naturalistic reductionism that eliminates any transcendent or objective moral standard beyond the individual organism's self-referential experience. The fourth ethical foundation is unconditional positive regard and non-judgmental acceptance, which establishes the therapist's stance as ethically neutral and value-free. Rogers insists that the therapist must accept the client's intrinsic worth regardless of their behaviors, beliefs, or choices, refraining from any form of moral judgment or evaluative commentary. This principle reflects the broader humanistic commitment to individual autonomy and the belief that external judgment—whether positive or negative—interferes with the client's natural growth process. The therapeutic relationship thus becomes a space completely free from external moral constraints, where the client can explore their feelings and choices without fear of criticism or rejection. Finally, Rogers' theory posits the human being as a self-grounding, autonomous entity, for whom the ultimate telos is "becoming one's real self." This real self is defined as a self free from externally imposed conditions of worth, guided entirely by the organism's own valuing process. Human autonomy, in this framework, is understood as absolute self-determination, freedom from all external constraints and influences, and the capacity to choose one's own values and direction independent of any transcendent reference. The good life, for Rogers, consists in this autonomous self-realization, the full expression of one's unique potentialities without interference or guidance from any authority beyond the individual's own experience. Misbah Yazdi's Islamic Ethical Framework Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi's ethical framework provides a comprehensive alternative rooted in Islamic metaphysics, epistemology, and teleology. At its core is the principle of moral realism and innate recognition (fiṭrī cognition) , which holds that moral judgments possess objective truth value and are discoverable through the innate, intuitive capacities of human reason. The human being is created with a "divine nature" (fiṭrah) that includes natural inclinations toward truth, justice, compassion, and the recognition of God's existence and sovereignty. This fiṭrah serves as the epistemological foundation for moral knowledge, enabling human beings to recognize the intrinsic goodness of justice and the intrinsic evil of oppression without requiring external instruction. Moral realism establishes that ethical propositions are truth-apt, that they refer to objective features of reality, and that rational argument can provide legitimate grounds for moral claims. This stands in direct opposition to moral relativism, which, according to Misbah Yazdi, leads to dangerous consequences including the collapse of meaningful moral discourse, the inability to criticize objectively wrong actions, the relativization of all moral values to individual preference or social convention, and ultimately the erosion of the ethical foundations of human life. Second, Misbah Yazdi grounds ethics in the concept of fiṭrah as the foundational structure of human nature. Fiṭrah refers to the set of cognitive, emotional, and practical inclinations that God has placed within human beings, directing them toward their true perfection and ultimate happiness. These innate dispositions are stable, universal, and unchanging, reflecting the consistent nature of human creation across time and culture. The ethical good consists in actions that align with and actualize this divine fiṭrah, while moral evil consists in deviation from and suppression of it. Unlike Rogers' purely naturalistic conception of a growth tendency, the Islamic concept of fiṭrah is inherently theistic and teleological, oriented toward the recognition and worship of God as the ultimate purpose of human existence. This orientation provides a substantive, objective content to ethical values, grounding them in the nature of human creation and the divine purpose for human life, rather than in individual subjective preference. Third, Misbah Yazdi emphasizes the teleological orientation of human life toward divine proximity (qurb ilā Allāh). The ultimate purpose of human existence, the final end toward which all ethical striving must be directed, is spiritual proximity to God and the attainment of divine pleasure (riḍwān). Ethical virtues derive their value from their capacity to facilitate this journey toward divine proximity, and moral actions are evaluated according to their contribution to this end. The final good, the highest perfection of which human beings are capable, consists in the complete actualization of their God-given potentialities through conscious, chosen submission to the divine will and the cultivation of virtues that bring the soul closer to its Creator. This teleological orientation ensures that ethics is neither arbitrary nor self-referential but is anchored in the objective structure of reality, the nature of human creation, and the divine purpose for human existence. Fourth, Misbah Yazdi articulates the integral relationship between reason, revelation, and ethics. Practical reason possesses the capacity to recognize fundamental moral principles and to discern the general contours of ethical life. However, reason alone is insufficient for the comprehensive guidance required for human perfection; it must be supplemented and guided by divine revelation through the prophets and the scriptures. Revelation provides specific guidance on the detailed applications of ethical principles, clarifies the precise content of the virtues, establishes clear boundaries for action, and supplies the motivational and sanction-based reinforcement necessary for consistent ethical practice. The complete ethical system, therefore, is a synthesis of rational reflection and revealed guidance, neither reducible to the other but each fulfilling complementary roles in the realization of the ethical life. Critical Analysis: Fundamental Incompatibilities The comparative analysis reveals several fundamental incompatibilities between Rogers' secular humanistic ethics and Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework. First, the critique of moral relativism and the absolute authority of subjective experience: Rogers' commitment to subjective experience as the ultimate moral arbiter leads inevitably to ethical relativism and the dissolution of any objective standard for moral judgment. From Misbah Yazdi's perspective, this position undermines the very possibility of meaningful ethical discourse, removes the basis for criticizing objectively wrong actions, and reduces morality to individual preference and social convention. The Islamic alternative, grounded in moral realism and innate fiṭrī cognition, affirms that moral judgments possess objective truth value, that human beings possess the capacity to recognize these truths through their divinely-endowed reason, and that ethical principles are universal and binding across individuals, cultures, and historical periods. Second, the critique of naturalism and the reduction of human perfection to psychological self-actualization: Rogers' actualizing tendency, while apparently positive in its orientation, articulates a reductive and materialistic account of human flourishing that confines human perfection to the realization of biological and psychological potentials within the framework of worldly existence. This conception neglects the transcendent dimension of human nature, the spiritual yearnings that constitute the deepest stratum of human identity, and the ultimate orientation of human existence toward the Divine. The Islamic concept of fiṭrah distinguishes between the merely biological drive toward growth and the authentic spiritual orientation toward God, affirming that true human perfection consists in the full actualization of the God-given spiritual potentialities that elevate the human being beyond the purely natural order. Third, the critique of absolute autonomy and the denial of divine relationality: Rogers' emphasis on human self-grounding and autonomy reflects a fundamental denial of the relational constitution of human identity, particularly the essential relation of the human being to God. In Islamic anthropology, the human being is not an autonomous, self-grounding entity but a servant ('abd) of God, whose perfection consists in the conscious, chosen realization of this servitude. True freedom is not freedom from any external constraint or value but freedom from lower attachments and the willful, voluntary commitment to divine submission. Rogers' rejection of all external authority, including religious and moral guidance, represents not authentic freedom but a form of rebellion against the very structure of human existence, a denial of the created nature of the human being and the dependence of the creature upon the Creator. Fourth, the critique of the organismic valuing process as an inadequate moral guide: Rogers' reliance on the organismic valuing process fails to provide any mechanism for resolving genuine moral conflicts, prioritizing competing goods, or regulating the tension between individual self-actualization and the legitimate rights and needs of others. When two individuals' self-actualization goals conflict, or when an individual's self-actualization path imposes unjust harm on others, the organismic valuing process offers no resources for adjudicating the dispute or establishing priorities. The Islamic alternative, grounded in objective moral principles, universal ethical norms, and the comprehensive guidance of revelation, provides a robust framework for resolving moral conflicts and establishing just social order. Fifth, the critique of situation ethics and the absence of a stable moral framework: Rogers' ethics, by its very nature, is situational, fluid, and context-dependent, lacking any fixed moral principles that could serve as stable guides for action across varying circumstances. The Islamic alternative, while recognizing the legitimate contextual variability of some ethical judgments, affirms the existence of objective moral principles and stable virtues that transcend situational variation. Principles such as justice, truthfulness, trustworthiness, compassion, and modesty are recognized as inherently good regardless of subjective experience, and vices such as oppression, deceit, betrayal, and cruelty are recognized as inherently evil regardless of individual preference. Practical Implications for Psychotherapy and Counseling The ethical divergence between Rogers' and Misbah Yazdi's frameworks translates into fundamentally different approaches to psychotherapy, with significant practical implications. In the Rogers framework, the goal of therapy is secular self-actualization, characterized by the congruence between self-concept, organismic experience, and behavior, with psychological health defined as this integration. The therapist's role is non-judgmental empathic reflection, establishing a safe space for clients to explore their experiences and arrive at their own decisions free from external guidance. The process focuses on the present moment and the client's lived experience, with the therapist refraining from any moral direction or value imposition beyond what the client autonomously chooses. In the Islamic faith-based therapeutic framework, by contrast, the ultimate goal is the realization of divine fiṭrah and spiritual proximity to God, with psychological health understood as the harmony between individual life and divine purposes, expressed through fulfillment of religious obligations and cultivation of moral virtues. The therapist serves as a spiritual and moral guide (muršid), drawing upon both professional psychological knowledge and religious expertise to help clients recognize deviation from their authentic fiṭrah and return to the path of spiritual growth. The therapeutic process integrates the material and spiritual dimensions of human existence, providing moral guidance grounded in Islamic teachings and offering meaningful frameworks for understanding suffering and pursuing healing. The therapist provides gentle, non-coercive ethical reminders when clients' actions conflict with Islamic values, helping clients explore the spiritual consequences of their choices and the alternative paths available within the religious tradition. Conclusion This research has examined and critiqued the ethical foundations of Carl Rogers' client-centered theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework. The analysis reveals fundamental and irreconcilable tensions between the two frameworks across multiple dimensions. Rogers' commitment to the absolute authority of subjective experience, organismic self-regulation, self-actualization as the ultimate human goal, unconditional positive regard, and human autonomy as self-grounding stands in direct conflict with the Islamic commitments to moral realism, divine fiṭrah, proximity to God as the human telos, the integral relationship between reason and revelation, and the radical relationality of human existence to God. The critique demonstrates that Rogers' framework, despite its valuable contributions to establishing a positive therapeutic relationship characterized by empathy, respect, and non-judgmental acceptance, suffers from fundamental philosophical weaknesses. Its moral relativism undermines the possibility of meaningful ethical discourse, its naturalistic reductionism neglects the transcendent spiritual dimension of human existence, its denial of divine relationality misunderstands the essential structure of human identity, and its lack of stable moral principles fails to provide adequate guidance for resolving moral conflicts or establishing just social relations. The Islamic ethical framework, as articulated by Misbah Yazdi, offers a more comprehensive and robust foundation for understanding human flourishing, therapeutic practice, and the ethical life. By integrating rational reflection with revelatory guidance, affirming the objective truth of moral principles, grounding ethics in the divine fiṭrah, and orienting human existence toward ultimate spiritual perfection, this framework provides both a profound critique of secular humanistic ethics and a constructive alternative for developing culturally appropriate and ethically sound approaches to psychotherapy in Islamic contexts. The practical implications of this philosophical analysis suggest that contemporary counseling practice in Muslim societies would benefit from integrating the therapeutic techniques of Rogers (empathy, unconditional positive regard, active listening) within an Islamic ethical framework that provides clear moral guidance, spiritual direction, and meaningful teleological orientation. This integrative approach would preserve the positive relational contributions of person-centered therapy while overcoming its philosophical limitations through an Islamic framework that recognizes both human dignity and human dependence upon divine guidance. Future research should explore this integration further through empirical studies examining the effectiveness of Islamic faith-based counseling approaches, comparative investigations of other Western therapeutic models from Islamic perspectives, and the development of practical training models for ethically-grounded, culturally-appropriate mental health practice in Muslim communities. نظریه مراجع‌محوری کارل راجرز به عنوان یکی از مکاتب انسان‌گرایانه (اومانیستی) روان‌درمانی، با محور قرار دادن مفهوم «خودشکوفایی» و «تمایل به سوی رشد»، مبانی اخلاقی خاصی را در حیطه رابطه درمانی و ارزش‌گذاری انسانی ارائه می‌دهد. این مقاله با روش تحلیلی-تطبیقی به بررسی و نقد این مبانی از منظر دیدگاه اخلاقی آیت‌الله مصباح یزدی، به عنوان نماینده‌ای برجسته از حکمت متعالیه صدرایی با رویکردی اسلامی، می‌پردازد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که اگرچه تأکید راجرز بر احترام به مراجع، همدلی غیرمشروط و پذیرش مثبت، از منظر اخلاق اسلامی نیز حائز ارزش است، اما مبانی ارزش شناسی این نظریه، به ویژه نسبی‌گرایی اخلاقی ناشی از مرجعیت محض تجربه ذهنی فرد و خودنظمی ارگانیزمی، فقدان غایت‌شناسی (تلئولوژی) الهی برای انسان و تعریف «خود» به مثابه موجودی خودبنیاد و دارای تمایل به خودشکوفایی و جدا از رابطه با خداوند، با دیدگاه اخلاقی مصباح یزدی که بر پایه حقیقت‌گرایی اخلاقی، فطرت الهی انسان و غایت‌مندی خلقت بر محور عبودیت و قرب الهی استوار است، در تعارض بنیادین قرار دارد. این نقد، نه تنها نقاط ضعف فلسفی نظریه راجرز را آشکار می‌سازد، بلکه ظرفیت نظام اخلاقی اسلام را در ارائه چارچوبی جامع‌تر برای رابطه کمک‌کننده، با حفظ کرامت انسانی و در عین حال جهت‌دهی او به سوی کمال حقیقی، نشان می‌دهد.

https://cph.samt.ac.ir/article_740972_d924879bc7ef2ce5252e042ee2464d41.pdf

سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها فلسفه تطبیقی 3041-9468 3 3 2026 11 22 Comparative Study of “Consciousness” from the Perspective of the Holy Qur’an and Panpsychism بررسی تطبیقی «آگاهی» از منظر قرآن کریم و همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری 35 52 740874 10.30487/cph.2026.2077951.1062 FA حبیب کارکن بیرق گروه آموزش معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه فرهنگیان، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2026 02 13 Abstract This study offers a comparative investigation of consciousness, and tasbih in the Qur’an vis à vis Panpsychism in the philosophy of mind. The Qur’an repeatedly speaks of cognition and tasbih among all entities, granting every element of existence life and undestanding. By contrast, Panpsychists claim that consciousness inheres in all particles of matter. Employing descriptive, analytical, and comparative methods, this paper argues that the principal challenges to Panpsychism—such as explaining mental causation in harmony with causal closure, and the combination problem—stem from its physicalist basis. These difficulties are irrelevant to the Qur’anic view, which rests on transcendence; a coherent account of Panpsychism is only attainable through recognition of the metaphysical dimension. Findings indicate that the Qur’an and Panpsychism both affirm universal consciousness but differ profoundly in ontological foundations. In Qur’anic thought, every atom of being is a creation of Divine Wisdom, and the consciousness and tasbih of creatures are purposive acts directed toward the recognition and praise of God, for every being possesses a share of knowledge and life in proportion to the degree of its participation in Being. Panpsychism, however, considers universal consciousness a merely natural property, devoid of divine orientation, arising from structural features of matter and governed by physicalism and causal closure. Thus, the similarity between Qur’anic thought and Panpsychism regarding consciousness is only verbal, not conceptual; they share language but not essence, therefore the two should not be regarded as identical. Introduction The nature and scope of consciousness constitute one of the most profound and enduring questions in both philosophy and theology. While contemporary philosophy of mind has grappled with the "hard problem of consciousness"—the challenge of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—the Qur'an presents a worldview in which consciousness permeate all levels of existence. The Qur'an repeatedly speaks of the glorification (tasbīḥ) of all creatures, attributing to every element of the cosmos a form of life, understanding, and purposeful praise of the Divine. This includes not only animals and plants but also inanimate objects such as mountains, stones, and celestial bodies, all of which are described as engaged in conscious worship of their Creator. This Qur'anic vision finds an intriguing parallel in panpsychism, a philosophical position that has gained renewed attention in contemporary philosophy of mind. Panpsychism holds that consciousness or some form of mentality is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, present in all particles of matter. According to this view, even the most basic constituents of reality—electrons, quarks, atoms—possess some primitive form of subjectivity or experience. While this position offers a potential solution to the mind-body problem by avoiding both reductive physicalism and substance dualism, it faces significant philosophical challenges, including the combination problem and difficulties in explaining mental causation within a causally closed physical framework. The apparent similarity between the Qur'anic affirmation of universal consciousness and the panpsychist claim of ubiquitous mentality raises important comparative questions. Do these two frameworks represent the same fundamental insight expressed in different languages? Or do they differ in their underlying ontological commitments, explanatory aims, and ultimate implications? The present study undertakes a comparative investigation of consciousness in the Qur'an and panpsychism, seeking to clarify both the points of convergence and the fundamental divergences between these two perspectives. The central research question asks: How does the concept of universal consciousness function within the Qur'anic worldview, and how does this compare with the philosophical claims of panpsychism? What are the ontological, teleological, and epistemological differences between these two frameworks? The significance of this comparative study lies in its potential to illuminate the relationship between revealed religious knowledge and contemporary philosophical inquiry. By examining the Qur'anic perspective on universal consciousness alongside panpsychism, we can better understand the distinctive features of each framework, avoid the fallacy of equating them based on superficial linguistic similarities, and appreciate the unique contributions of each to our understanding of consciousness, existence, and the relationship between the created order and the Divine Research Methodology This research employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, structured around a problem-oriented approach rather than a theory-equating or worldview-equating framework. The comparative logic follows Oliver Freiberger's methodological model for comparative studies in religion, which emphasizes five key stages: (1) selection of sources and the "tertium comparationis" (common ground for comparison), (2) description of data, (3) juxtaposition, (4) redescription, and (5) rectification and theory formation. This approach enables systematic comparison while respecting the distinct conceptual horizons and epistemological foundations of each tradition. The research adopts a problem-oriented comparative framework, focusing on the specific question of "the relationship between consciousness and the non-human world"—a question addressed in both religious scripture and contemporary philosophy of mind, albeit within different conceptual frameworks. The Qur'an is treated as a revealed text with its own ontological language, while panpsychism is examined as a philosophical position within the analytic tradition of philosophy of mind. The study does not assume that the Qur'an is a philosophical text nor that panpsychism constitutes a religious worldview; rather, it acknowledges the structural differences between religious and philosophical discourses while enabling a focused comparison at the level of conceptual function. Data were collected through library research, drawing upon primary sources including the Qur'an with its classical and contemporary exegetical works (particularly the extensive commentary of Allameh Tabataba'i), foundational works in Islamic philosophy such as those of Mulla Sadra, and key texts in contemporary philosophy of mind The analysis proceeds through careful conceptual clarification, examination of arguments and counterarguments, and systematic comparison of the two frameworks across multiple dimensions including ontology, teleology, and explanatory scope. Discussion The Qur'anic Conception of Universal Consciousness and Glorification The Qur'an contains numerous verses that explicitly or implicitly affirm the consciousness and of all creatures, including those conventionally regarded as inanimate. The concept of tasbīḥ (glorification) serves as the primary vehicle for this affirmation, with entire chapters of the Qur'an—known as the musabbiḥāt—opening with declarations that everything in the heavens and earth glorifies God. Verses such as "Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth glorifies Allah" (Qur'an, 59:1) and "The thunder glorifies His praise, and the angels too from awe of Him" (Qur'an, 13:13) indicate that glorification is not limited to conscious human beings or angels but extends throughout creation. The Qur'an also speaks of the conscious obedience of apparently non-conscious entities: mountains and birds glorifying with David (Qur'an, 21:79), the earth and sky being commanded and obeying (Qur'an, 41:11), and inanimate objects bearing witness on the Day of Judgment (Qur'an, 24:24; 36:65). These verses present a worldview in which the entire cosmos is alive, Conscious, and engaged in purposeful worship of its Creator. Exegetical tradition has offered two main interpretive approaches to these verses. The first approach, represented by figures such as Fakhr[01l1] al-Dīn al-Razi, interprets the glorification of non-conscious beings metaphorically—as "the language of the state" (lisān al-ḥāl) rather than actual verbal glorification. According to this view, the order and design of creation point to the existence and unity of God, and this evidential role constitutes a form of metaphorical praise. The second approach, strongly defended by Allameh Tabataba'i and others, affirms that the glorification of all creatures is literal and real, not metaphorical. Tabataba'i argues that if the glorification were merely metaphorical, there would be no reason for the Qur'an to state that "you do not understand their glorification" (Qur'an, 17:44), since metaphorical glorification is readily understood by all. The very fact that human beings are said to be unable to comprehend this glorification indicates that it is a real form of speech and consciousness, though one that operates in a manner different from human language. Tabataba'i develops a sophisticated philosophical defense of this view, drawing upon the principle of [01l1] systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd). He argues that just as existence admits of degrees, so too do the attributes of existence, including knowledge, life, will, and perception. Every being possesses knowledge and life in proportion to its share of existence; indeed, wherever creation extends, knowledge extends with it. This is not to say that all beings possess the same type or degree of knowledge, nor that they know everything that humans know; rather, each being has a level of consciousness appropriate to its ontological station. Tabataba'i explicitly addresses the objection that if non-human beings possess consciousness, they should display behavior similar to that of conscious animals. He responds that consciousness admits of varying degrees, and the effects of consciousness vary accordingly—just as human consciousness differs from animal consciousness, so too does the consciousness of plants and inanimate objects differ from that of animals. The conception of speech (nuṭq) in the Qur'an receives similar treatment. Tabataba'i defines the reality of speech as the disclosure of what is in the heart, the revelation of one's inner meaning to others. This disclosure can occur through various means—spoken words, gestures, writing, or any other form of expression. Speech is not essentially tied to conventional human language; rather, any entity whose very existence expresses meaning and intention can be said to speak. This expansive understanding of language and communication enables the Qur'anic affirmation that all creatures possess a form of speech, language, and consciousness that is real, even if human beings cannot directly perceive it. The famous tradition of the pebbles glorifying in the hand of the Prophet Muhammad is interpreted by Tabataba'i not as a suspension of natural laws but as an opening of spiritual perception: the pebbles were always glorifying, and the Prophet's miracle consisted in enabling others to hear what is always present but ordinarily inaccessible to human senses. Panpsychism: Definition, Arguments, and Challenges Panpsychism, in its contemporary formulation, holds that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, present in all particles of matter. As David Skrbina defines it, panpsychism is the view that "all things have a mind, or mind-like qualities[01l1] ," whether these are understood as conscious experience, subjective qualities, or some form of proto-mentality. This position has ancient roots, appearing in various forms in both Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, but has received renewed attention in recent philosophy of mind as a potential solution to the mind-body problem. Nagel’s argument involves four premises: 1. Material Composition—Living organisms are complex material systems with no immaterial parts. The matter composing us is not special; the matter composing any material entity, if broken down far enough and rearranged, could in principle be incorporated into a living organism. 2. Realism—Mental states are genuine properties of living organisms. 3. No Radical Emergence—All the properties of a complex organism are intelligibly derived from the properties of its parts. 4. Non-Reductionism—The mental states of an organism are not intelligibly derived from its physical properties alone (including the physical properties of its parts). Nagel concludes from these premises that there must be non-physical properties of basic matter that, when combined in the right way, intelligibly imply the existence of mental states. It is worth noting that, although Nagel calls the resulting view “panpsychism”, it seems compatible with panprotopsychism (discussed above). The second argument, advanced by Galen Strawson, contends that physicalism, properly understood, entails panpsychism. According to Strawson, all mental events are physical, and physicalism requires that the ultimate constituents of reality possess some intrinsic nature. If mental phenomena are real and physical, then the qualities of conscious experience must be properties of fundamental physical entities. The alternative—that consciousness emerges from entirely non-conscious matter—requires positing a form of radical emergence that is conceptually obscure and lacks explanatory power. Panpsychism faces several significant challenges. The first is the "combination problem," widely regarded as the most serious difficulty for the view. The problem concerns how the experiences of many "micro-subjects" (such as fundamental particles) combine to form the unified conscious experience of a "macro-subject" (such as a human being). Unlike the way bricks combine to form a house, or molecules combine to form a liquid, the combination of conscious experiences into a unified consciousness is difficult to understand. Some panpsychists, such as William Seager, have proposed "emergent panpsychism" as a solution, suggesting that micro-experiences combine and transform into macro-experiences, but critics argue that this merely replaces one mystery with another. The second challenge concerns mental causation within a causally closed physical framework. If the physical world is causally closed—meaning that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause—then how can mental states have any causal influence on the physical world? Panpsychists respond that if consciousness is intrinsic to matter, then mental causation is part of the physical system rather than a problematic intervention from outside. However, this response depends on the validity of causal closure, a principle that is itself controversial and challenged from multiple philosophical and theological perspectives. A third challenge involves the intuitive implausibility of attributing consciousness to fundamental particles. Many philosophers and laypeople find it deeply counterintuitive to suppose that electrons, quarks, or atoms possess any form of conscious experience. Panpsychists respond by pointing to other counterintuitive yet well-established scientific claims, such as the relativity of time, arguing that intuitive resistance is not a reliable guide to truth. However, critics contend that the radical counterintuitiveness of panpsychism, combined with its other difficulties, renders it a less attractive option than alternative approaches. Comparative Analysis: Points of Convergence and Divergence A systematic comparison between the Qur'anic perspective and panpsychism reveals both significant points of convergence and fundamental divergences. Points of Convergence: Both frameworks affirm the ubiquity of consciousness or beyond the human realm. Both reject reductive physicalist accounts that would reduce consciousness to mere chemical or mechanical processes. Both recognize consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality that cannot be dismissed or explained away. Both acknowledge that human beings may be incapable of fully understanding or perceiving the forms of consciousness present in other beings. Points of Divergence: The ontological foundations of the two views are fundamentally different. Panpsychism is a philosophical position arising from the attempt to solve the mind-body problem within a physicalist framework; it treats consciousness as an intrinsic property of matter. The Qur'anic view, by contrast, is a revealed perspective grounded in divine creation and purposeful design; consciousness in the Qur'an is not an intrinsic property of matter but a gift from the Creator, an expression of divine will and wisdom. Every particle of creation is a creature of God, and its consciousness and glorification are directed toward the recognition and praise of the Creator. The teleological orientation of consciousness also differs radically. In the Qur'anic view, the consciousness and glorification of all creatures are purposeful: they are directed toward the knowledge and praise of God. Every being, in its own way and to the extent of its ontological capacity, participates in the universal worship of the Creator. In panpsychism, by contrast, universal consciousness is devoid of any transcendent orientation; it is simply a natural property of matter that arises from the structure of nature itself. There is no inherent direction toward the divine, no purposeful recognition of a Creator. The explanatory contexts of the two views are also distinct. Panpsychism is a response to the explanatory gap in contemporary philosophy of mind—the failure of reductive physicalism to account for subjective experience. It represents a philosophical attempt to solve a specific problem within the Western analytic tradition. The Qur'anic view, by contrast, arises from a comprehensive theological and ontological framework in which all existence is understood through the lens of divine creation, order, and purpose. The Qur'an's affirmation of universal consciousness is not offered as a solution to a philosophical puzzle but as a revelation of the deeper structure of reality. Panpsychism, as articulated by contemporary philosophers, is often motivated by the need to explain mental causation in a way consistent with the principle of causal closure—the principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. The Qur'anic view, however, operates within a framework of divine sovereignty and transcendence that contradicts any such closure. From the Islamic perspective, the physical world is one of many worlds created by God; it is not closed or self-sufficient but is continuously sustained and governed by divine will. Therefore, the Qur'anic affirmation of universal consciousness does not require, and is not constrained by, the principle of causal closure. A crucial implication of this analysis is that the apparent similarity between the Qur'anic view and panpsychism is at best a verbal similarity, not a conceptual or ontological one. Both use terms such as "consciousness" and to describe non-human entities, but the meanings of these terms, their ontological grounding, their explanatory function, and their ultimate implications are radically different. To equate the Qur'anic view with panpsychism would be to commit the fallacy of equivocation, treating linguistic convergence as evidence of conceptual identity. Conclusion This comparative study has examined the concept of consciousness in the Qur'an and panpsychism, revealing both points of convergence and fundamental divergence. The Qur'an affirms that all creatures possess consciousness, language, and glorification, rooted in their ontological participation in existence and their purposeful orientation toward God. Panpsychism affirms that consciousness is ubiquitous, present in all particles of matter, arising from the intrinsic nature of physical reality. Both reject reductive physicalism and acknowledge the reality of consciousness beyond the human realm. However, the two frameworks differ fundamentally in their ontological foundations, teleological orientation, and explanatory contexts. The Qur'anic view is grounded in divine creation, systematic ambiguity of existence, and the purposeful worship of the Creator; it affirms that every being possesses knowledge and life in proportion to its share of existence, and that its glorification is a real, conscious act of praise. Panpsychism is grounded in philosophical naturalism and physicalist commitments; it treats consciousness as an intrinsic property of matter, devoid of transcendent orientation or purpose. The Qur'anic view operates within a framework of divine sovereignty and transcendence, while panpsychism operates within a framework of causal closure and naturalistic explanation. The analysis demonstrates that the apparent similarity between the Qur'anic perspective and panpsychism regarding universal consciousness is merely verbal, not conceptual. To equate them would be to overlook their profound ontological, teleological, and explanatory differences. The Qur'anic view of universal consciousness is not a philosophical theory to be evaluated by the same criteria as panpsychism; it is a revealed affirmation of the depth and meaning of creation, oriented toward the recognition and praise of the Divine. This comparative study thus contributes to a deeper understanding of both frameworks and highlights the importance of careful conceptual analysis in comparative theology and philosophy. این پژوهش با هدف بررسی تطبیقی مفهوم آگاهی و شعور و تسبیح موجودات در قرآن کریم و دیدگاه همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری در فلسفه ذهن نگاشته شده است. قرآن کریم در آیات متعدد، از تسبیح و ادراک موجودات سخن می‌گوید و برای همه اجزای عالم حیات و فهم قائل است. در مقابل، قائلین به همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری معتقدند که آگاهی در تمام ذرات ماده وجود دارد. در این مقاله که به روش توصیفی، تحلیلی و تطبیقی نوشته شده، استدلال کرده‌ایم که اشکالاتی مانند نیاز به توضیح علّیت ذهنی به نحوی که با اصل بستار علّی سازگار باشد، و «مشکل ترکیب» از اشکالات اساسی همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری است که مبتنی بر فیزیکالیسم است، اما این اشکالات بر دیدگاه قرآنی وارد نیست و جز با باور به ماوراءطبیعت نمی‌توان تبیین معقولی از همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری ارائه داد. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که قرآن کریم و همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری هر دو در پذیرش آگاهی و شعور همگانی مشترک‌اند، امّا در مبانی هستی‌شناختی تفاوت اساسی دارند: در اندیشه قرآنی، تمام ذرات عالم مخلوق اراده حکیمانه الهی است و آگاهی و تسبیح موجودات، هدفمند و متوجهِ شناخت و حمد خداوند است، زیرا هر موجود به اندازه‌ بهره‌مندی‌اش از وجود، بهره‌ای از علم و حیات دارد؛ در حالی که، در همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری، شعور همگانی فاقد جهتی الهی است و صرفاً نتیجه‌ ساختار طبیعت قلمداد می‌شود، زیرا بر فیزیکالیسم و بستار علّی جهان تکیه دارد. لذا اشتراک دیدگاه قرآنی و همه‌روان‌دار‌انگاری در موضوع آگاهی تنها اشترک لفظی است و نباید آن دو را عین هم دانست.

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سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها فلسفه تطبیقی 3041-9468 3 3 2026 11 22 On The Concept of Love: Avicenna’s Philosophical and Medical View بررسی مفهوم عشق از دیدگاه فلسفی و دیدگاه طبی ابن سینا 53 70 741023 10.30487/cph.2026.2046635.1042 FA شمس الله سراج گروه فلسفه وکلام اسلامی دانشکده الهیات دانشگاه ایلام 0000-0003-2104-1904 Journal Article 2025 11 10 Abstract Based on his philosophical-mystical foundations regarding love, The Grand Sheikh considered love to be flowing and prevalent in all aspects of existence, and examined it in seven chapters of various levels of existence. He analyzed love in animal souls, love in beautiful forms, love in divine souls, and finally love in divine nature, which is the highest and most perfect type of love. In his philosophical-mystical view, love was absolute good, as he believed that good is in itself desirable, popular and beloved. He defined every movement in the world of possibility towards perfection as love; and considered all such movements to be the result of love incarnated in every living being—how he defines love in “A Treatise on Love” (Risālah fī al-'Ishq). As a doctor, he mentioned love as a disease that presents with symptoms, and that comes with a cure. In the law, love is recognized as a disease, as the soul and body affect each other. The psychological symptoms of love in the fourth stage, that is, love in the animal soul, manifests in the body of the lover; having observed symptoms such as emaciation, cachexia, dry and sunken eyes, the doctor diagnoses a disease—a disease affected by carnal passions. Introduction Love, as one of the most profound and enduring human experiences, has captivated the attention of philosophers, mystics, poets, and physicians throughout history. Its nature, origins, and manifestations have been explored from countless perspectives, yet its essential mystery remains elusive. Among the most remarkable figures to address this phenomenon is Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 1037), the preeminent philosopher-physician of the Islamic world. Uniquely situated as both a master of philosophical metaphysics and a practitioner of medicine, Ibn Sīnā offers a distinctive dual perspective on love that reflects the depth and breadth of his intellectual vision. In his philosophical and mystical writings, particularly the Risāla fī al-'Ishq (Treatise on Love) and the final sections of the Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt (Remarks and Admonitions), he presents love as a cosmic principle pervading all levels of existence, from the simplest material substances to the Divine Essence itself. In his medical magnum opus, the Qānūn (Canon of Medicine), however, he discusses love as a specific psychological-physical disorder with identifiable symptoms, causes, and treatments. This apparent duality raises a fundamental question: How could the same thinker who portrays love as the supreme cosmic good and the motive force behind all movement toward perfection also describe it as a form of melancholic obsession requiring medical intervention? Is there a contradiction in Ibn Sīnā's thought, or does his sophisticated philosophical psychology provide the means to reconcile these seemingly disparate perspectives? The present study seeks to address this question by examining Ibn Sīnā's treatment of love across his philosophical and medical writings, demonstrating that far from being contradictory, his two perspectives reflect a coherent and integrated understanding of love as a phenomenon that manifests differently across the ontological hierarchy of existence. The significance of this investigation lies in its potential to illuminate the deep connections between Ibn Sīnā's philosophical anthropology, his medical theory, and his mystical thought. By examining how love functions at different levels of existence—from inanimate substances through plants, animals, and human beings to the Divine—we can appreciate the systematic unity of his intellectual project and the sophisticated way in which he integrates insights from philosophy, mysticism, and medicine into a comprehensive worldview. This study contributes to the growing body of scholarship on Ibn Sīnā's psychology and his theory of the soul-body relationship, while also offering insights into the broader question of how pre-modern thinkers integrated scientific and philosophical approaches to human experience. Research Methodology This research employs a descriptive-comparative method, systematically examining Ibn Sīnā's treatment of love in his philosophical and medical writings. Data were collected through library research, focusing on primary sources including the Risāla fī al-'Ishq, the Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt (particularly the eighth section on love), and the Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb (Book Three, on diseases of the soul). The analysis proceeds through careful textual examination, conceptual clarification, and systematic comparison of Ibn Sīnā's philosophical and medical perspectives. The descriptive phase involves presenting Ibn Sīnā's seven-fold hierarchy of love as articulated in the Risāla fī al-'Ishq, from the simplest inanimate substances through vegetative souls, animal souls, human souls, and ultimately the Divine Essence. Each level of love is described in terms of its objects, motivations, and characteristics. The medical perspective is then examined through Ibn Sīnā's discussion of love as a disease in the Qānūn, including its definition, symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment. The comparative phase synthesizes these two perspectives, demonstrating how they are reconciled through Ibn Sīnā's theory of the soul-body relationship and his understanding of the graded nature of existence. The research also engages with relevant secondary literature and commentaries on Ibn Sīnā's thought, including the works of later philosophers such as Mullā Ṣadrā and contemporary scholars, to contextualize the analysis and to assess the broader implications of Ibn Sīnā's views for understanding the relationship between philosophy, mysticism, and medicine in the Islamic intellectual tradition. Discussion Love in Ibn Sīnā's Philosophical-Mystical Thought In Ibn Sīnā's philosophical framework, love is understood as a fundamental cosmic principle that pervades all levels of existence. He begins the Risāla fī al-'Ishq by asserting that the concept of love is self-evident and requires no proof; rather, his task is to demonstrate its presence and operation throughout the hierarchy of being. The treatise proceeds through seven chapters, each corresponding to a different level of existence, from the simplest material substances to the Divine Essence. Ibn Sīnā's understanding of love is grounded in his metaphysical principles. Following the axiom that "every contingent being is a composite of existence and quiddity," he argues that existence is the source of all good and perfection, while quiddity is the source of limitation and deficiency. Every contingent being, by virtue of its existence, yearns toward good and perfection, and by virtue of its quiddity, recoils from deficiency and imperfection. This innate yearning is what Ibn Sīnā calls "love." It is a natural, instinctive inclination that permeates all of creation and ensures the preservation and continuity of existence. Love in Inanimate Substances: Ibn Sīnā identifies three types of simple, non-living substances, each possessing its own form of instinctual love. Prime matter (hayūlā) loves form, constantly seeking it to actualize its potential, much like an ugly woman who covers her face to hide her ugliness. Form loves its subject, never separating from it, and accidents love their subjects as well, because without them they would have no existence. Even in the simplest material substances, there is a kind of natural love that ensures their continued existence and proper functioning. Love in Plants: The vegetative soul possesses three faculties—nutrition, growth, and reproduction—each associated with a specific form of love. The nutritive faculty loves food, seeking it when needed and incorporating it into the organism. The growth faculty loves expansion, striving to develop in three dimensions in proportion to the organism's capacity. The reproductive faculty loves generation, seeking to produce a being similar to itself to ensure the continuity of the species. These loves are natural and instinctual, operating without choice or deliberation. Love in Animals: The animal soul has faculties that are each characterized by specific natural loves. External senses have natural inclinations toward certain objects and aversions toward others—without these, all sensations would be equal and the animal would be unable to distinguish beneficial from harmful. Internal senses, including imagination and memory, experience love as a sense of ease and pleasure when their objects are present and a yearning when they are absent. The irascible faculty loves victory, revenge, and overcoming enemies, and recoils from humiliation. The concupiscent faculty loves reproduction and the satisfaction of natural desires. Ibn Sīnā distinguishes between natural and voluntary love in animals. Natural love operates without choice, as in the case of reproduction driven by the reproductive faculty; voluntary love involves choice and deliberation, as when an animal chooses between different goods based on its understanding of what will best preserve its life. The concupiscent faculty in animals serves as a bridge between natural and voluntary love, reflecting God's wisdom in ensuring the continuity of species through a combination of instinctual drive and conscious choice. Love of Beautiful Forms: At the human level, love of beautiful forms manifests in three progressively more refined ways: embracing, kissing, and sexual union. The third type, sexual union, belongs to the animal aspect of human nature, but when conducted within the bounds of religious law and for the purpose of procreation, it participates in the divine wisdom of preserving the species. The first two types—embracing and kissing—are expressions of the love of beauty itself, rather than of physical desire, and they reflect the natural affinity between souls. Ibn Sīnā also addresses the relationship between outer beauty and inner character. He cites the Prophet's saying, "Seek your needs from those who have beautiful faces," arguing that a person's external appearance is often a reflection of their inner nature, though this is not always the case, as external circumstances or bad company may obscure an originally good nature. Thus, human love of beautiful forms can serve as a gateway to higher forms of love, provided it is guided by wisdom and law. Love of Divine Souls: The highest level of love attainable by human souls is the love of God, the Absolute Good. Every soul that perceives the good naturally loves it, and souls—whether human or angelic—love the First Cause because their perfection consists in cognizing intelligibles and in resembling the Absolute Good through knowledge and virtuous action. Angels love the preservation and continuation of the cosmos, and their love is a reflection of the love of the First Cause for creation. Ibn Sīnā concludes his treatise by establishing that all beings love the Absolute Good by their very nature, and that the Absolute Good, in turn, loves to bestow its goodness upon all beings through its eternal generosity. The existence of all beings is a manifestation of divine love. True love is the delight in the perception of the presence of the Good, while longing (shawq) is the movement toward the completion of that delight. God, as the ultimate object of love, is both lover and beloved, as His essence is the most perfect object of perception and delight. Love as a Disease in Ibn Sīnā's Medical Thought In his medical work the Qānūn, Ibn Sīnā presents a strikingly different perspective on love, discussing it as a specific disease that primarily affects young people whose minds become preoccupied with the beauty of another person. He identifies it as a form of melancholic obsession (marad waswāsī) closely resembling melancholia (mālikhūliyā), characterized by the sufferer's persistent absorption in thoughts of the beloved, to the exclusion of all else. Ibn Sīnā provides a detailed description of the physical symptoms of love-sickness: hollowed, dry eyes that water only when crying; drooping eyelids that suggest a gaze upon something delightful; intermittent breathing with deep sighs; a disheveled appearance; and an irregular pulse that changes when the beloved's name is mentioned or when the beloved appears. The sufferer may fluctuate between intense joy and deep sadness, sometimes laughing one moment and crying the next. The body loses its moisture and becomes dry, thin, and weak—much like a liquid that evaporates under heat. One of the most remarkable aspects of Ibn Sīnā's medical discussion of love is his method for diagnosing the identity of the beloved. The physician should take the patient's pulse while mentioning various names, observing when the pulse changes; then, with the name of the beloved identified, the physician should mention various cities and regions until the place of the beloved is also discovered. By combining the name and location, the physician can identify the beloved and, if possible, arrange for the patient to be united with them. Ibn Sīnā provides practical therapeutic advice. Once the patient's humors have been properly balanced and cleansed, the physician should seek to distract the patient's mind through engaging conversations and pleasant activities. The patient should be encouraged to consider the beloved's faults and to hear negative reports about them from old women. If possible, the patient should be encouraged to transfer their affection to another person, provided this can be done lawfully. In more severe cases, where the disease has become deeply entrenched, more aggressive treatments may be required, including those used for melancholia and mania. A notable limitation of Ibn Sīnā's medical treatment of love is that he provides specific therapeutic recommendations only for men. While he acknowledges that both men and women can suffer from love—the story of Zulaykhā and Joseph serving as a prominent example—he does not offer parallel therapeutic advice for women. This limitation may reflect the social constraints of his time, when women were unable to disclose their feelings publicly due to the shame associated with love, but it remains a significant oversight in an otherwise comprehensive medical account. Reconciling the Two Perspectives: The Soul-Body Relationship The apparent contradiction between Ibn Sīnā's philosophical and medical views of love is resolved through his sophisticated understanding of the soul-body relationship. For Ibn Sīnā, the soul is a substantial form of the body—a non-material substance that nevertheless interacts with and is influenced by the body. This interaction operates in two directions, and it is this dual influence that explains how love can manifest as both a spiritual perfection and a physical disease. First, the body affects the soul: when the bodily faculties perceive something, or when the imagination forms an image, or when desire or anger is aroused, these bodily states give rise to corresponding states in the soul. If these states are repeated, they become stable dispositions (malakāt) that shape the character and inclinations of the soul. This explains how physical perceptions of beauty can give rise to powerful emotional states, and how repeated thoughts of the beloved can produce lasting patterns of thought and feeling. Second, and equally important, the soul affects the body: when the soul experiences powerful emotions or forms intense imaginings, these psychological states produce corresponding effects in the body. Intense fear causes trembling; anger causes the blood to boil; the memory of a frightening event produces a rapid pulse. In the case of love, the soul's intense preoccupation with the beloved causes physical changes: the drying of bodily humors, changes in the pulse, and the other symptoms Ibn Sīnā describes. The soul's state is literally embodied. This two-way interaction means that love cannot be understood as purely spiritual or purely physical; it is always a psychosomatic phenomenon. When love remains within its natural and proper bounds—the love of God or the love of the Absolute Good—it brings spiritual perfection and does not produce disease. But when love becomes focused on physical beauty in an excessive and obsessive way, the soul's preoccupation produces physical disturbances that manifest as a disease of the body. The same underlying capacity for love, which in its highest expression is the motive force of the cosmos and the path to divine proximity, becomes pathological when it operates at the animal level without the guidance of reason and law. Ibn Sīnā's medical account of love provides, in effect, a diagnosis of love operating at the lowest level of the hierarchy—the level of animal desire and physical obsession—and demonstrates the physical consequences of this pathological manifestation. His philosophical account, by contrast, presents love in its full ontological range, from its most degraded and pathological forms to its most elevated and perfect expression in the Divine Essence. The two perspectives are not contradictory; they are complementary, each revealing a different dimension of love depending on the level of existence at which it manifests. Conclusion This study has examined Ibn Sīnā's treatment of love in his philosophical and medical writings, demonstrating that far from being contradictory, his two perspectives constitute a coherent and integrated understanding of love as a phenomenon that manifests differently across the ontological hierarchy. In his philosophical-mystical thought, Ibn Sīnā presents love as a universal cosmic principle that pervades all of existence, from the simplest inanimate substances through vegetative, animal, and human souls to the Divine Essence itself. Love, in this framework, is the innate drive of every being toward its own perfection and toward the Absolute Good, and it serves as the motive force for all movement and change in the cosmos. The highest and most perfect form of love is the love of God, which is both the source and the goal of all existence. In his medical thought, Ibn Sīnā presents love as a specific psychological-physical disease characterized by obsessive thoughts of the beloved, physical symptoms such as hollow eyes, dry skin, irregular pulse, and behavioral symptoms including alternating joy and sadness. He provides detailed diagnostic methods, including the remarkable pulse-diagnosis technique, and practical therapeutic recommendations. The limitation of his treatment to men reflects the social constraints of his era but does not undermine the sophistication of his medical analysis. The two perspectives are reconciled through Ibn Sīnā's theory of the soul-body relationship. The soul and body interact in two directions: the body affects the soul through perception, imagination, and emotion, while the soul affects the body through the power of mental states to produce physical changes. When love operates at the animal level, focused on physical beauty and excessive desire, it produces the physical symptoms of disease. When love operates at higher levels, directed toward the Absolute Good, it produces spiritual perfection. Love in itself is not a disease; it is a fundamental principle of existence. But when it manifests at the level of the animal soul and becomes excessive, it produces physical symptoms that the physician must treat. Ibn Sīnā thus demonstrates the unity of his intellectual vision, integrating philosophy, mysticism, and medicine into a comprehensive understanding of human experience, and affirming that the same phenomenon can appear as both the highest perfection and as a disease, depending on its level of manifestation and the context in which it operates. بررسی مفهوم عشق از دیدگاه فلسفی و دیدگاه طبی ابن سینا چکیده جناب شیخ الرئیس براساس مبانی فلسفی-عرفانی خود در باب عشق، عشق را در تمام وجوه هستی جاری وساری می‌داند و آن را در هفت فصل از مراتب گوناگون هستی مورد بررسی قرار می‌دهد. ایشان عشق را در نفوس حیوانی، عشق به صور حسنه، عشق در نفوس الهیه و نهایتاً عشق در ذات الهی که برترین و کاملترین نوع عشق است واکاوی می‌کند. عشق در نگاه فلسفی-عرفانی ایشان خیر مطلق است، چنان‌که معتقد است خیر بذاته مطلوب، محبوب و معشوق است.هر حرکتی در عالم امکان به سمت و سوی کمال را، عشق تعریف کرده و تمامی این حرکات را ناشی از عشقی می‌داند که در نهاد تمام موجودات قرار گرفته است. ایشان عشق را این‌گونه در رساله العشق تعریف کرده‌اند. هم ایشان به عنوان یک طبیب از عشق به عنوان یک بیماری یادکرده که آثاری دارد و علاجی. عشق در قانون به عنوان یک بیماری شناخته شده، چرا که به جهت متأثر بودن نفس و بدن از یکدیگر، آثار روحی و روانی عشق در مرحله چهارم، یعنی عشق در نفوس حیوانی بر بدن عاشق هویدا و پیدا شده و طبیب با مشاهدۀ آثاری همچون لاغری،زردی، گود و خشک شدن زیر چشم و... حکم به بیماری می‌دهد. بیماری که متأثر از حالت نفسانی است. کلید واژه‌ها: ابن سینا، عشق، رساله العشق، قانون

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سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها فلسفه تطبیقی 3041-9468 3 3 2026 11 22 A comparative study of Mulla Sadra's and Allama Tabataba'i's views on the existence of a causal link بررسی تطبیقی دیدگاه ملاصدرا و علامه طباطبایی در مسئله وجود رابط معلول 71 84 740973 10.30487/cph.2026.2086769.1082 FA سید محمد مهدی نبویان گروه فلسفه و کلام دانشگاه قم 0009-0004-4010-8363 Journal Article 2026 04 19 Abstract The issue of the existence of a relationship is one of the important issues in Islamic philosophy, which has been the focus of discussion among Islamic scholars, especially since the time of Mulla Sadra Shirazi. Mulla Sadra, by precisely defining the existence of the relation and also stating the characteristics of the existence of the relation of the effect and the consequences of accepting them, opened a new chapter on the truth of the existence of the effect; to the extent that all philosophers after him commented on his view. One of these philosophers is Allameh Tabataba'i, who, like Mulla Sadra, has addressed this issue with particular care and has enumerated specific characteristics for the existence of the relation. This article uses an analytical method and a comparative approach to explain the views of Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabataba'i on the issue of the existence of a causal relationship and a comparative study between them, and explains the similarities and differences between these two thinkers, and finally evaluates their views. These two philosophers share the same view of the existence of the affected, but they do not understand the independence of the existence of the affected relation, the lack of essence, and the acceptance of the personal unity of existence through the problem of the existence of the relation. They also differ in whether the existence of the affected relation has one status or two statuses, the specific difference or lack of specific difference between independent and relational existence, the reality of the division of existence into independent and relational, the verbal or spiritual commonality of the application of existence to relational and independent, and also in the definition of relational existence. These issues will be evaluated in the final section of the article. Therefore, the main question of the following article is how to reconcile the views of Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabataba'i on the issue of the existence of a disabled link. Introduction The problem of "relational existence" (al-wujūd al-rābiṭ) stands as one of the most significant and enduring questions in Islamic philosophy, having occupied a central place in metaphysical discourse particularly since the time of Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1635). With his precise definition of relational existence and his articulation of its distinctive characteristics and philosophical implications, Ṣadrā opened a new chapter in understanding the nature of created existence, influencing virtually all subsequent philosophers in the Islamic tradition. His doctrine that contingent beings possess a "relational" rather than "independent" mode of existence fundamentally transformed the way philosophers conceptualized the relationship between the Creator and creation, leading to profound consequences for ontology, epistemology, and theology. Mullā Ṣadrā's innovation lay in his rejection of the prevailing view among earlier philosophers that contingent beings possess two aspects: a "self-oriented" aspect (ḥaythiyya fī nafsihā) pertaining to their quiddity, and an "other-oriented" aspect (ḥaythiyya li-ghayrihā) pertaining to their existence. Instead, Ṣadrā argued that the very existence of contingent beings is nothing but relation and dependence upon their cause; they possess no self-subsistent reality whatsoever. This radical re-conceptualization led him to affirm that all created existents are "relational" (rābiṭ) rather than merely "relative" (rābiṭī), and that true independent existence belongs exclusively to God. From this foundation, Ṣadrā developed his famous doctrine of the personal unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd al-shakhṣiyya), according to which there is only one single reality in existence, and all other things are relations, manifestations, and aspects of that one reality. Among the philosophers who critically engaged with Ṣadrā's doctrine and developed their own distinctive positions on this question was Allameh Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī (d. 1981), one of the most influential Islamic philosophers of the twentieth century. While Ṭabāṭabā'ī accepted the fundamental insight that contingent beings are relational in their existence, he disagreed with certain aspects of Ṣadrā's formulation and proposed modifications that had significant philosophical consequences. His nuanced treatment of the question, particularly his distinction between two aspects of relational existence, represents an important development in the Sadrian tradition. The present study undertakes a comparative investigation of the two philosophers' doctrines concerning relational existence, aiming to clarify both the points of agreement and the points of divergence between them. The central research question asks: How can the theories of Mullā Ṣadrā and Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī concerning relational existence be compared and contrasted, and what are the philosophical implications of their respective positions? By examining their definitions, the characteristics they attribute to relational existence, and the consequences they derive from this doctrine, this study seeks to illuminate the distinctive contributions of each thinker and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. The significance of this comparative study lies not only in its contribution to understanding these two major figures but also in its potential to deepen our understanding of the broader metaphysical issues concerning the nature of existence, causality, and the relationship between the finite and the infinite. Research Methodology This research employs an analytical and comparative methodology to examine and evaluate the doctrines of Mullā Ṣadrā and Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī concerning relational existence. The study proceeds through four main phases: (1) systematic exposition of Ṣadrā's doctrine, including his definitions of relational existence and the characteristics he attributes to it; (2) systematic exposition of Ṭabāṭabā'ī's doctrine, including his definitions, characteristics, and distinctive contributions; (3) comparative analysis identifying points of agreement and divergence between the two philosophers; and (4) critical evaluation of both theories, assessing their philosophical strengths and weaknesses. The research draws upon primary sources from both philosophers. For Ṣadrā, the study relies on his magnum opus Al-Ḥikma al-Muta'āliya fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyya al-Arba'a (The Transcendent Philosophy in the Four Intellectual Journeys), as well as his other major works including Al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād (The Origin and the Return), Al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyya (The Lordly Witnesses), and Al-Mashā'ir (The Metaphysical Penetrations). For Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the study examines his philosophical works including Bidāyat al-Ḥikma (The Beginning of Wisdom), Nihāyat al-Ḥikma (The End of Wisdom), his glosses on philosophical texts, and his exegetical work Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān. Secondary sources, including commentaries and critical studies, are consulted for clarification and contextualization. The comparative framework is organized around key thematic dimensions: (1) the definition of relational existence and the distinction between different senses of "relation"; (2) the ontological status of relational existence and its characteristics; (3) the question of whether relational existence possesses a "self-aspect" (ḥaythiyya fī nafsihā) or only an "other-aspect" (ḥaythiyya li-ghayrihā); (4) the issue of whether independent and relational existence differ in kind (type) or only in degree; (5) the question of whether the term "existence" is applied to independent and relational existence univocally or equivocally; and (6) the implications of the doctrine for the theory of the personal unity of existence. The analysis proceeds through careful textual examination, conceptual clarification, logical evaluation, and critical assessment of philosophical arguments. Discussion Mullā Ṣadrā's Doctrine of Relational Existence Mullā Ṣadrā devotes a separate chapter in the Asfār to defining relational existence and its characteristics, offering three distinct definitions that correspond to three senses of "relation" in his philosophical terminology. The first definition pertains to the mental order: relational existence is a mode of existence that cannot be conceived independently but only in conjunction with an independent concept; this is what Ṣadrā calls the "prepositional meaning" (ma'nā ḥarfī), as opposed to the "nominal meaning" (ma'nā ismī). In this sense, relational existence corresponds to the role of prepositions in language—concepts that have no independent meaning but function as connectors between other concepts. Ṣadrā emphasizes that this division pertains to conceptual existence in the mind, not to external reality, and that independent and relational existence in this sense differ in kind and share only the name. The second definition addresses the level of conceptual existence but with reference to external reality: relational existence (al-wujūd al-rābiṭī) is existence that, although possessing an independent concept in the mind, serves as a description and attribute of something else in external reality. Ṣadrā calls this "existence in itself but for another" (wujūd fī nafsihi li-ghayrihi). This sense applies to accidents and qualities that, while conceptually independent as universal notions, in external reality are attributes of substances. In this sense, relational existence is a species of independent existence rather than its opposite, and it is compatible with the first sense of independent existence. The third definition pertains strictly to external reality: relational existence (al-wujūd al-rābiṭ) is existence that is pure relation and dependence upon another, lacking any self-aspect or independent reality. This is the definition that Ṣadrā applies to contingent existence as such. According to this view, contingent beings do not possess any reality of their own; their entire reality consists of relation to and dependence upon their cause. This is what Ṣadrā means when he says that contingent existence is "being through another" (wujūd fī ghayrihi) rather than "existence in itself" (wujūd fī nafsihi). To distinguish this sense from the second, Ṣadrā calls the second "relative existence" (rābiṭī) and the third "relational existence" (rābiṭ). The characteristics Ṣadrā attributes to relational existence in this third sense are far-reaching in their implications. First, relational existence possesses no "self-aspect" (ḥaythiyya fī nafsihā); its entire identity is its "other-aspect" (ḥaythiyya li-ghayrihā), pure relation and dependence upon its cause. Second, because it lacks any self-aspect, relational existence does not constitute a reality alongside other realities; it cannot be counted as an independent entity in the inventory of existence. It is not a second reality parallel to the reality of its cause but rather a manifestation and aspect of the cause itself. Third, relational existence is not a separate existence alongside its cause; it is a relation of one existence—the existence of the cause—not existence itself; it is an effect of existence, not existence proper. Fourth, because relational existence lacks any self-identity, it cannot be subject to any judgment or proposition; the attribution of existence to it is not strictly correct. Fifth, relational existence cannot be independently perceived; the perception—whether conceptual or intuitive—of relational existence is actually the perception of the cause in its manifested mode. This means that when we perceive contingent beings, we are in reality perceiving the cause at a particular level of manifestation, not a separate independent reality. Sixth, Ṣadrā's denial of independent existence to contingent beings does not entail nihilism; rather, he affirms that contingent beings are manifestations and aspects of God, and he accepts their multiplicity as multiplicity in manifestations, not multiplicity in existences. There is a single existence that manifests itself in diverse modes and levels. Finally, Ṣadrā draws the crucial conclusion that from the doctrine of relational existence follows the theory of the personal unity of existence: there is only one personal existent in the universe, and everything else is its relations, aspects, and manifestations. This conclusion represents the crowning achievement of Ṣadrā's metaphysical system, synthesizing his earlier arguments for the principiality of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), the gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), and the relational nature of contingent existence. Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī's Doctrine of Relational Existence Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī, while deeply influenced by Ṣadrā's metaphysical insights, developed his own distinctive formulation of the doctrine of relational existence. He defines relational existence as "existence in another" (wujūd fī ghayrihi)—existence that lacks any independent self-hood and is pure relation and dependence upon another existent. Like Ṣadrā, Ṭabāṭabā'ī emphasizes that relational existence has no self-aspect, no reality independent of its cause, and cannot be counted as a separate reality alongside other realities. However, Ṭabāṭabā'ī's formulation differs from Ṣadrā's in several important respects. First, Ṭabāṭabā'ī explicitly distinguishes between the concept (mafhūm) of existence and the external reality (miṣdāq) of existence. The concept of existence, as such, is neutral with respect to independence and relation; it takes on these determinations only through its external instantiation. Thus, the division of existence into independent and relational is a division pertaining to external reality, not to conceptual meaning. A concept is independent or relational only because it derives from an independent or relational external existent. This subtle but crucial point enables Ṭabāṭabā'ī to affirm that the same concept of existence can be applied to both independent and relational existents, provided that the external existents share in the reality of existence. Second, Ṭabāṭabā'ī distinguishes three applications of the term "relational existence": (1) relational existence in propositions (as a copula or connective); (2) relational existence of contingent beings (their dependence upon their cause); and (3) relational existence among relative categories. According to Ṭabāṭabā'ī, all three are instances of a single meaning of "relation"—a relation of dependence and connection—and thus share the same conceptual nature. Third, and most significantly, Ṭabāṭabā'ī differs from Ṣadrā in his treatment of the question of whether relational existence possesses a self-aspect. While Ṣadrā emphatically denies any self-aspect to relational existence, Ṭabāṭabā'ī affirms that contingent existence possesses two aspects: a relational aspect and an independent aspect. According to Ṭabāṭabā'ī, when we consider a contingent being in relation to its cause, it is pure relation and dependence—this is its "relational aspect." However, when we consider the same being in itself and in comparison with other creatures, it possesses a kind of independence and can be treated as a distinct entity—this is its "independent aspect." These two aspects, for Ṭabāṭabā'ī, are not merely conceptual or conventional; they are real aspects of the external existent itself. A contingent being is not simply relational and nothing else; rather, it possesses a dual character: relationally dependent upon its cause, but possessing a certain self-identity in relation to other creatures. This means that the same external reality can serve as both a relational and an independent term, depending on the perspective from which it is considered. The implications of this position are far-reaching. Because relational existence possesses an independent aspect, it can be conceived independently; that is, it can function as the subject of a concept and as a term in judgments and propositions. Moreover, because the same reality can be considered relationally or independently, the application of the concept of existence to both independent and relational existents is not equivocal but univocal; they share in the same meaning of existence, though they instantiate it in different modes. Thus, Ṭabāṭabā'ī affirms that existence is applied to independent and relational existents with univocal meaning (ishtirāk ma'nawī), in contrast to Ṣadrā's apparent affirmation of equivocal meaning (ishtirāk lafẓī). Comparative Analysis: Agreement and Disagreement The comparative analysis reveals six significant points of agreement between Ṣadrā and Ṭabāṭabā'ī. First, both philosophers affirm that contingent existence is relational rather than independent; its nature is pure relation and dependence upon its cause, lacking any self-subsistence. Second, both hold that relational existence has no "self-aspect" in the sense of possessing an independent self-hood; its identity is its relation to and dependence upon its cause. Third, both affirm that relational existence is an aspect or manifestation of its cause, not a separate reality alongside it. Fourth, both hold that the perception of relational existence is only possible through the perception of its cause; independent perception of relational existence is impossible. Fifth, both hold that relational existence lacks quiddity (māhiyya)—or at least that it cannot be defined in terms of quiddity in the same way as independent existence. Sixth, both derive from the relational nature of contingent existence the conclusion that there is a personal unity of existence: only one independent reality exists, and all else is relation, manifestation, and aspect of that reality. The analysis also reveals five significant points of disagreement. First, regarding the aspects of relational existence, Ṣadrā holds that relational existence possesses only one aspect—the relational aspect—and completely lacks any self-aspect. Ṭabāṭabā'ī, by contrast, affirms that relational existence possesses two real aspects: a relational aspect (when considered in relation to its cause) and an independent aspect (when considered in itself). Second, regarding the question of whether independent and relational existence differ in kind, Ṣadrā affirms a difference in kind (type)—they share only the name of existence and do not participate in a common meaning. Ṭabāṭabā'ī denies any difference in kind; the difference is one of mode or aspect, not of type. Third, regarding the division of existence into independent and relational, Ṣadrā denies that this is a genuine division because the divisions of a concept must be mutually exclusive, whereas relational existence is not independent of independent existence but a relation to it. Ṭabāṭabā'ī, by contrast, affirms that this is a genuine division because independent and relational existence are distinct modes of the same reality. Fourth, regarding the application of the term "existence" to independent and relational existence, Ṣadrā holds that it is equivocal (since independent and relational existence differ in kind), whereas Ṭabāṭabā'ī holds that it is univocal (since they share in the same meaning of existence). Fifth, regarding the definition of relational existence, Ṣadrā offers three distinct definitions corresponding to three senses of relation, while Ṭabāṭabā'ī offers a single definition with three applications. Critical Evaluation The critical evaluation of the two philosophers' doctrines yields several important insights. First, the argument that relational existence leads to the personal unity of existence requires careful scrutiny. The claim that contingent beings are relational establishes only that they are pure relation to and dependence upon their cause; it does not establish that they have no independent existence whatsoever. The term "relational existence" can mean either (a) existence that is relation (as a prepositional meaning, with no independent existence) or (b) the relation of one existent to another (as a nominal meaning, existing as an attribute of both terms). Ṣadrā's argument for the personal unity of existence relies on the first meaning, but what his proof actually establishes is only the second—namely, that contingent beings are essentially related to their cause. It does not follow from this that contingent beings have no reality whatsoever; they may possess their own reality while being essentially related to the cause. Thus, the argument does not establish the personal unity of existence but only the essential relationality of created beings to their Creator. Second, the claim that all contingent beings are relational is problematic. Contingent beings can be categorized into three types: (1) existence in itself for itself (wujūd fī nafsihi li-nafsihi), such as the intellects; (2) existence in itself for another (wujūd fī nafsihi li-ghayrihi), such as accidents and qualities; and (3) existence in another or relational existence (wujūd fī ghayrihi or rābiṭ), such as the relationship between a book and a table. Each of these three types is contingent and essentially related to God, but only the third is relational in the sense of being pure relation. To claim that all three are relational is to conflate essential relationality (being contingent and dependent) with being pure relation. This represents a confusion between ontological dependence and relational mode of existence. Third, regarding the disagreement about whether independent and relational existence differ in kind, the evaluation favors Ṭabāṭabā'ī's position. Relational existence can be conceived both prepositionally (with a non-independent concept) and nominally (with an independent concept). The concept "relation" (nisba) or "relational existence" (wujūd rābiṭ) is itself a nominal, independent concept that refers to relational existence. Thus, the same reality of relational existence can be signified by both prepositional and nominal concepts. This does not require first positing independence for relational existence; rather, the nominal concept directly signifies relational existence as a relation, without any prior assumption of independence. Therefore, independent and relational existence do not differ in kind; they are distinct modes of the same reality. Fourth, the claim that relational existence lacks quiddity is problematic. If, as argued above, relational existence can be signified by a nominal concept, then it possesses quiddity—the "whatness" of relation. This quiddity is distinct from the quiddity of independent existence, but it is nevertheless a quiddity proper to relational existence. To deny quiddity to relational existence would be to eliminate all quiddity from the created world, since all created beings are relational. Yet quiddity clearly applies to creatures in their mode of being. Fifth, the claim that relational existence cannot be the subject of judgments is likewise problematic. If relational existence possesses quiddity and can be signified by nominal concepts, then it can function as the subject or predicate of propositions. Relations, properties, and aspects of things are clearly objects of thought and discourse, and they can be affirmed or denied of things. Thus, relational existence can indeed be subject to judgments and can be the subject or predicate of propositions. Conclusion This comparative study has examined the doctrines of Mullā Ṣadrā and Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī concerning relational existence, revealing both significant points of agreement and important points of divergence. The six points of agreement demonstrate that both philosophers share a fundamental commitment to the relational nature of contingent existence, its dependence upon its cause, its status as an aspect of the cause, the impossibility of its independent perception, its lack of quiddity, and the implication of this doctrine for the theory of the unity of existence. These shared commitments reflect the deep continuity of the Sadrian metaphysical tradition and the centrality of the concept of relational existence in shaping subsequent Islamic philosophy. The five points of divergence reveal important differences in how these two philosophers conceptualize the nature of relational existence, its relation to independent existence, and the implications of this doctrine. Ṣadrā's position is more radical in denying any self-aspect to relational existence, affirming a difference in kind between independent and relational existence, denying the genuineness of the division between them, affirming the equivocal application of the term "existence," and offering multiple definitions of relational existence. Ṭabāṭabā'ī's position is more nuanced in affirming the duality of aspects in relational existence, denying the difference in kind, affirming the genuineness of the division, affirming the univocal application of "existence," and offering a single definition with multiple applications. The critical evaluation suggests that Ṭabāṭabā'ī's formulation addresses certain difficulties in Ṣadrā's position. The claim that relational existence leads to the personal unity of existence requires further support; what the argument establishes is essential relationality, not the denial of any independent existence to creatures. The claim that all contingent beings are relational conflates essential relationality with being pure relation; a distinction must be made between the three modes of contingent existence. The affirmative position that independent and relational existence differ in kind is rejected in favor of Ṭabāṭabā'ī's position that they differ in mode; a nominal concept can directly signify relational existence without prior assumption of independence. Consequently, relational existence does possess quiddity and can function as the subject of judgments. The study thus demonstrates the philosophical richness and ongoing development of the Sadrian tradition, showing how Ṭabāṭabā'ī critically engaged with Ṣadrā's insights, refined them, and developed a more nuanced formulation that addressed certain difficulties while preserving the core commitments of the tradition. This comparative analysis contributes to a deeper understanding of both philosophers and to the broader metaphysical question of the nature of created existence and its relationship to the Divine. مبحث وجود رابط یکی از مباحث مهم فلسفه اسلامی است که به صورت ویژه از زمان ملاصدرای شیرازی محور بحث اندیشمندان اسلامی قرار گرفته است. ملاصدرا با تعریف دقیق وجود رابط و نیز بیان ویژگی های وجود رابط معلول و نتایج پذیرش آنها، بابی جدید درباره حقیقت وجود معلول گشود؛ تا جایی که همه فیلسوفان پس از او، نسبت به دیدگاه وی اظهار نظر کردند. یکی از این فیلسوفان، علامه طباطبایی است که همچون ملاصدرا با دقتی خاص به این مسئله پرداخته و ویژگی های خاصی برای وجود رابط برشمرده است. این مقاله با روش تحلیلی و رویکردی تطبیقی به تبیین دیدگاه ملاصدرا و علامه طباطبایی در مسئله وجود رابط معلول و بررسی تطبیقی میان آنها می پردازد و اشتراکات و تفاوت های این دو اندیشمند را بیان می کند و در پایان نیز به ارزیابی دیدگاه های ایشان می پردازد. این دو فیلسوف در عین ربط دانستنِ وجود معلول، عدم درک استقلالی وجود رابط معلول، فقدان ماهیت و پذیرش وحدت شخصی وجود از راه مسئله وجود رابط، اشتراک دارند و در یک حیثیت یا دو حیثیتی بودن وجود رابط معلول، اختلاف نوعی یا عدم اختلاف نوعی میان وجود مستقل و رابط، حقیقی بودنِ تقسیم وجود به مستقل و رابط، اشتراک لفظی یا معنوی بودنِ اطلاق وجود به رابط و مستقل و همچنین در تعریف وجود رابط تفاوت دارند. در بخش پایانی مقاله این مطالب مورد ارزیابی قرار خواهند گرفت. از این رو، پرسش اصلی مقاله پیش‌رو، چگونگی تطبیق دیدگاه ملاصدرا و علامه طباطبایی در مسئله وجود رابط معلول است.

https://cph.samt.ac.ir/article_740973_d7f2848151aba68421a3e9785ea26a7e.pdf

سازمان مطالعه و تدوین کتب علوم انسانی دانشگاهها فلسفه تطبیقی 3041-9468 3 3 2026 11 22 ManiManifestations of practical wisdom in the actions and character of women in Shahnameh جلوه های حکمت عملی در کنش و منش زنان شاهنامه 85 102 740875 10.30487/cph.2026.2083351.1073 FA ملیحه صابری نجف آبادی دانشار سازمان سمت Journal Article 2026 01 07 Abstract According to Ferdowsi, the women of the Shahnameh have played an active and often positive role in the events and epics; to the extent that they enjoy a high and prestigious moral status. As a sage, Ferdowsi describes the virtues and wise role of women at different individual, family and social levels, and in this narrative, he endorses virtuous ethics. In this literary masterpiece, we encounter women who, although they have diverse moral personalities, many of them represent wise and prudent lives. On the other hand, wisdom, i.e., household management and family management, is shaped by the role of the most important pillar of the family, i.e. women. The wise women of the Shahnameh in their various positions of wife, mother and child are excellent examples of wise behavior and speech. It also talks about women who were aware of the statecraft and were concerned with governance with prudence and wisdom. In this article, by taking a brief look at the actions and behaviors of women in the Shahnameh, we aim to prove that the prudence and wisdom of women in the Shahnameh are not limited to their individual and moral spheres, and their prudence also resonates in the social arena. Women work side by side with men to reform matters in the family and the larger society. Introduction The Shāhnāmeh (The Book of Kings) of Hakim Abul-Qasim Ferdowsi stands as one of the most monumental literary and philosophical achievements in world literature, representing not merely an epic chronicle of Iranian history but a profound meditation on wisdom, justice, and the human condition. Composed over thirty years and completed around 1010 CE, this masterpiece weaves together mythological, legendary, and historical narratives spanning thousands of years, presenting a rich tapestry of heroic deeds, moral struggles, and philosophical reflections. While the epic ostensibly recounts the martial exploits of legendary kings and warriors, Ferdowsi's deeper purpose is to articulate the principles of practical wisdom (ḥikmat-i 'amalī)—the art of living virtuously and making ethically sound decisions in the complex circumstances of human life. The Shāhnāmeh is fundamentally a meaning-centered narrative that presents exemplary models of wisdom, justice, courage, and moral integrity. Ferdowsi repeatedly emphasizes that human beings are distinguished from all other creatures by their capacity for reason and their ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, right from wrong. This rational capacity is presented as the foundation of human salvation and dignity. The heroes of the epic are not merely warriors but embodiments of practical wisdom, their actions reflecting a profound understanding of ethical principles, social responsibilities, and the consequences of human choices. A remarkable but often overlooked feature of the Shāhnāmeh is the prominent and active role played by women throughout its narratives. Contrary to the common perception that women in epic literature are passive figures confined to the margins of male-dominated action, Ferdowsi presents women as agents of decisive influence—advisors, warriors, rulers, protectors, and moral exemplars. From the resourceful and courageous Gordāfarid, who takes up arms against the mighty Sohrāb, to the wise and diplomatic Sindokht, who prevents a catastrophic war through her eloquence and political acumen; from the steadfast and devoted Farānak, who risks everything to save her infant son Ferēdūn from the tyrant Żaḥḥāk, to the ambitious and influential queens such as Pūrāndokht and Āzarmdokht who actually ruled Iran—women in the Shāhnāmeh consistently demonstrate intelligence, resolve, and practical wisdom across all domains of life. The present study investigates the manifestations of practical wisdom in the actions and character of women in the Shāhnāmeh, analyzing their roles and contributions at three interrelated levels: individual ethics (personal virtue and moral character), household management (tadbīr-i manzil), and social governance (siyāsat-i madan). This framework is derived from the Aristotelian classification of practical wisdom as articulated in the Nicomachean Ethics, which has also been developed within the Islamic philosophical tradition by thinkers such as al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. By examining how women in the Shāhnāmeh exemplify practical wisdom in these three domains, the study challenges reductive interpretations—such as those of Theodor Nöldeke—that dismiss women's roles in the epic as merely passive or limited to romantic contexts. Instead, it demonstrates that Ferdowsi presents women as full participants in the ethical and political life of the community, whose wisdom and virtue are essential to the proper functioning of both family and society. Research Methodology This research employs a qualitative, library-based, and analytical-interpretative methodology. The primary data are extracted from the complete text of the Shāhnāmeh (Moscow edition), and the analysis is conducted through systematic and careful reading of passages related to women's actions, speech, and decisions. The research proceeds through three main phases: data extraction, thematic classification, and interpretive analysis. In the first phase, all verses and narratives involving women's activities, consultations, decisions, ethical choices, conflicts, and interactions are identified and collected. This comprehensive survey covers women across different social roles—daughters, wives, mothers, queens, warriors, and rulers—and across various historical and legendary periods of the epic. The second phase involves thematic classification of the collected material according to the three levels of practical wisdom: individual ethics (virtues such as wisdom, courage, chastity, patience, loyalty), household management (roles in marriage, motherhood, and domestic administration), and social governance (political acumen, leadership, and contributions to the welfare of the community). This classification is informed by the Aristotelian framework as developed in the Islamic philosophical tradition. The third phase involves interpretive analysis, employing both within-text comparison and cross-case comparison. Within-text comparison examines how different women in similar situations respond to comparable challenges, revealing patterns of virtuous behavior and practical reasoning. Cross-case comparison contrasts women's roles with those of men in similar contexts to assess the presence or absence of gender-based differentiation in the attribution of virtues and practical wisdom. Throughout the analysis, the study aims to identify the qualities and virtues that are most consistently presented as praiseworthy and exemplary in women, and to demonstrate how these contribute to the broader ethical framework of the epic. The analysis also engages critically with prior scholarship, particularly the views of scholars who have minimized women's significance in the Shāhnāmeh, testing these claims against the textual evidence. Discussion Practical Wisdom in Aristotle and the Islamic Philosophical Tradition Practical wisdom, or phronēsis in Aristotle's terminology, is distinguished from theoretical wisdom (sophia) in that it concerns contingent, variable matters of everyday life—ethics, household management, and political governance—rather than eternal, unchanging truths. Aristotle defines practical wisdom as the capacity to deliberate well about what is good and beneficial for oneself and for the community, and to choose the most appropriate means to achieve these goods in specific, complex situations. It is not merely the knowledge of general ethical principles but the ability to apply them judiciously in particular circumstances, considering all relevant factors and balancing competing claims. The practically wise person knows not only what is good in general but what is good for them in this specific situation. In the Islamic philosophical tradition, the framework of practical wisdom was developed by al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and other thinkers, who distinguished three branches: individual ethics (akhlāq), household management (tadbīr al-manzil), and political governance (siyāsat al-madan). Individual ethics concerns the cultivation of virtues such as wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, and the discipline of one's desires and emotions. Household management concerns the proper administration of the family, including relationships between spouses, parents and children, and the economic management of the household. Political governance concerns the administration of the city or state, including legislation, justice, leadership, and the promotion of the common good. Each of these branches requires practical wisdom—the ability to recognize what is good and to choose effective means to achieve it in the specific circumstances of one's life. The heroes of Ferdowsi's epic consistently embody this practical wisdom. They are not merely physically powerful but intellectually and morally virtuous; their actions reflect careful deliberation, ethical sensitivity, and a commitment to justice and truth. This wisdom is not abstract or theoretical but is manifested in their concrete choices, their responses to challenges, and their interactions with others. Ferdowsi's purpose, as a ḥakīm (sage), is to present exemplary models of human excellence that can inspire and guide his readers. Individual Ethics: Wisdom, Courage, and Virtue in Women At the level of individual ethics, the women of the Shāhnāmeh display a remarkable range of virtues that are consistently praised by Ferdowsi. Wisdom (khirad) is presented as the most fundamental virtue, and many women are explicitly described as wise and far-sighted. The archetype of the wise woman is Sindokht, wife of Mehrāb, king of Kābul. She is praised as "possessing wisdom and a radiant heart," "far-sighted," and "of clear mind." In the most critical moment of her story—when her daughter Rūdābeh's love for Zāl threatens to provoke a war between Kābul and Iran—Sindokht employs her wisdom to find a peaceful resolution. She confronts Zāl's father, the great hero Sām, voluntarily placing herself in danger to plead for mercy for her people. Her eloquence and reasoning are so effective that Sām, moved by her words, abandons his plan to destroy Kābul and agrees to the marriage. This episode demonstrates not only Sindokht's personal virtue but her capacity to apply wisdom effectively in a complex political and familial crisis. Farānak, mother of Ferēdūn, exemplifies wisdom combined with courage and maternal devotion. When the tyrant Żaḥḥāk seeks to kill her infant son, Farānak secretly carries him to the remote mountains of Alborz, entrusting him to the care of a hermit, thereby saving him from the tyrant's agents. She endures the destruction of her home and the loss of her husband, who is murdered by Żaḥḥāk, with remarkable fortitude. When Ferēdūn, now a young man, learns of his identity and wishes to seek vengeance against Żaḥḥāk, Farānak initially advises patience and caution, recognizing the enormity of the challenge—a sign of her practical wisdom. Ultimately, she supports his quest, praying to God for his success. Farānak's story illustrates the combination of protective love, forbearance, and strategic thinking that Ferdowsi presents as exemplary maternal virtue. Courage (shujā'at) is another virtue prominently displayed by women. Gordāfarid, the daughter of Gūdarz, is the first female warrior in the Iranian epic. When the warrior Sohrāb, son of Rostam, attacks the White Fortress, her father's forces are unable to resist him. Gordāfarid disguises herself as a warrior and rides out to confront Sohrāb in single combat. Despite being eventually overpowered, she fights with remarkable skill and courage. When Sohrāb removes her helmet and discovers she is a woman, she uses her wit to escape, tricking Sohrāb into following her to the fortress gates and then safely entering, leaving him locked outside. She then taunts him from the battlements, demonstrating not only physical courage but psychological astuteness. Gordāfarid's courage is not the rashness of the foolhardy but the measured courage of practical wisdom, combined with quick thinking and strategic deception when direct confrontation proves insufficient. Rostam's wife Tahmīneh displays courage of a different kind—the courage of independent choice. She initiates contact with Rostam, declares her love, and takes responsibility for her own marriage. She is described as possessing a wise soul and a pure body. After Rostam leaves, she raises their son Sohrāb with dignity and honor. When Sohrāb learns of his father's identity and decides to march against Iran, Tahmīneh is placed in an impossible position, caught between her loyalty to her son and her knowledge that her husband will be his adversary. Her grief upon learning of Sohrāb's death at his father's hands is overwhelming, and she dies of sorrow within a year—a testament to her profound love and maternal devotion. Tahmīneh's story illustrates practical wisdom in the context of love, choice, and loyalty. Kitāyūn, daughter of the Emperor of Rūm (Byzantium), exemplifies the virtue of choosing wisely in marriage. When the exiled Iranian prince Goshtāsb arrives incognito at her father's court, Kitāyūn recognizes his worth and chooses him as her husband, despite his lack of wealth or status. Her choice is vindicated when Goshtāsb eventually returns to Iran and becomes king. Kitāyūn is also portrayed as far-sighted; her warnings about the dangers of her son Esfandiyār's ambition prove accurate, though tragically, her son does not heed them. Her story demonstrates practical wisdom in the domain of personal choice and familial relationships. Household Management: Women as Wives and Mothers In the sphere of household management (tadbīr-i manzil), the women of the Shāhnāmeh play indispensable roles. Aristotelian philosophy emphasizes that the household is the fundamental unit of society, and that its proper management is essential for the flourishing of both the family and the larger community. Ferdowsi similarly recognizes the centrality of women in maintaining the integrity, harmony, and moral character of the home. Loyalty and Devotion in Marriage: The wives of the Shāhnāmeh consistently demonstrate profound loyalty and devotion to their husbands. Farangīs, wife of Siyāvosh and daughter of Afrāsiyāb, provides a powerful example. When her father murders Siyāvosh, Farangīs is torn between her loyalty to her husband and her duty to her father. She chooses to honor her husband, grieving openly and expressing her anguish despite the danger to herself. She is also the devoted mother of Kaykhosrow, the future king, and she protects and nurtures her son, ensuring his survival and eventual rise to power. Her story exemplifies practical wisdom in the face of familial conflict and political danger. Sindokht, as the wife of the rather crude and impulsive King Mehrāb, consistently guides her husband with her wisdom. Mehrāb is described as short-tempered and lacking in foresight, but Sindokht's counsel prevents him from acting rashly. When he learns of their daughter's love and threatens to kill her, Sindokht's intervention saves Rūdābeh's life. Sindokht's practical wisdom in the domestic sphere protects not only her family but also the broader political stability of Kābul. She is a true partner to her husband, complementing his deficiencies with her own strengths. Golshahr, wife of the wise counselor Pīrān, exemplifies the supportive role of the wise wife. She assists her husband in his efforts to protect Siyāvosh and later to protect Farangīs and Kaykhosrow. Her hospitality, kindness, and strategic support are essential to Pīrān's successful interventions. Her story demonstrates that practical wisdom in the household can have profound implications for the larger political order. Motherhood and Moral Education: The role of the mother is presented as one of profound significance. Rūdābeh, mother of Rostam, the greatest hero of Iranian legend, endures the most difficult childbirth imaginable—her son is so large that he must be delivered by caesarean section, performed by the mythical bird Simorgh. Rūdābeh's suffering is described with deep pathos, and her strength, endurance, and devotion are presented as essential to the birth of the epic's greatest champion. The mother's willingness to endure pain for the sake of her child is presented as a fundamental aspect of maternal virtue. Farangīs, in addition to her role as a wife, is a model of maternal devotion. After her husband's murder, she protects her unborn child, Kaykhosrow, from her father's attempts to have him killed. She raises Kaykhosrow with wisdom and integrity, instilling in him the qualities of justice, courage, and mercy that will later make him a great king. Her success in this undertaking—against overwhelming odds and in the face of constant danger—demonstrates the power of practical wisdom in the maternal role. Tahmīneh, as mother of Sohrāb, faces the ultimate tragedy: her son, seeking to find his father, is instead killed by him in battle. Tahmīneh had raised Sohrāb with love and pride, teaching him of his father's greatness. When she learns of his death, her grief is inconsolable. Her story illustrates the tragic dimension of maternal love and the profound impact of maternal influence on the character and destiny of the child. Social Governance: Women as Rulers and Political Actors The third sphere of practical wisdom is social governance (siyāsat-i madan)—the art of administering the state and ensuring the welfare of the community. In this domain, the women of the Shāhnāmeh make some of their most striking contributions. Ferdowsi presents several women who rule as sovereigns or exercise decisive political influence. Humāy-e Chahrzād: The first queen regnant of Iran in the epic is Humāy, daughter of King Bahman. She is installed as ruler with the agreement of the nobles and rules Iran for thirty-two years, administering justice and promoting prosperity. Ferdowsi portrays her as a wise and just ruler, describing her reign as a period of flourishing: She placed the crown upon her head, And established a new way and custom. She gave gifts to all the troops, Opened the treasury and distributed gold. She surpassed her father in counsel and justice, Through her justice, the world was made prosperous. She sought only justice and goodness in the world, And she kept the world straight in all its ways. Humāy's reign is presented as a model of righteous governance—a testament to the capacity of women to rule with wisdom and effectiveness. Pūrāndokht and Āzarmdokht, daughters of Khosrow Parviz, ruled Iran during the chaotic period following their father's assassination. Pūrāndokht, the elder, is described as a good and just sovereign who remitted taxes, repaired bridges, and governed with compassion and wisdom. She ruled for six months before succumbing to illness. Āzarmdokht, known as al-ʿĀdilah (the Just), is described as intelligent, powerful, and beautiful, though her reign was brief. These women, though their reigns were short, represent a significant acknowledgment in the epic of women's capacity for sovereign rule. Qeydāfeh, the Queen of Andalusia, provides another remarkable example of female political wisdom. During the time of Alexander the Great, Qeydāfeh governed her kingdom with such intelligence and strategic cunning that Alexander, despite having conquered vast territories, was unable to defeat her. Instead of direct military confrontation, Alexander was forced to enter her court in disguise, and she recognized him through her clever intelligence. Through political negotiation, she prevented the destruction of her realm. Ferdowsi praises her as wise, generous, and discerning, noting that Alexander himself acknowledged her exceptional qualities. Qeydāfeh's story illustrates political wisdom in its most refined form—the ability to protect one's people through intelligence, diplomacy, and strategic insight rather than brute force. Gordīyeh: The sister of Bahrām-e Chūbīneh demonstrates political wisdom in the domestic realm of the state. When her brother rebelled against the Sassanian king Khosrow Parviz, Gordīyeh advised him against it, recognizing the dangers of rebellion and the importance of loyalty to the legitimate sovereign. After Bahrām's eventual defeat and death, Gordīyeh entered the court of Khosrow Parviz. She later used her intelligence and political skill to rescue the citizens of her homeland, Rayy, from the tyranny of a cruel governor appointed by the king. She staged a clever demonstration, dressing a cat in luxurious robes and presenting it to the king, who was so amused that he granted her request to replace the oppressive governor with herself. Her rule brought peace and justice to Rayy, demonstrating practical wisdom in the service of the public good. These examples demonstrate that women in the Shāhnāmeh are not passive or marginal figures but full participants in the political and social life of the community. Their wisdom, courage, and strategic intelligence are consistently presented as essential to the welfare of the state and the flourishing of the people. Conclusion The women of the Shahnameh play a role in household management that extends far beyond maintaining the outward appearance of the family. They interpret and negotiate relationships, protect the life and identity of future generations, question and challenge power, and, in moments of crisis, create a language of peace. In these narratives, the family is not a private institution detached from politics. A decision made within the inner chambers of the household may alter the fate of an entire city or even a dynasty. By placing women at the center of such decisions, Ferdowsi offers a complex conception of practical wisdom. Wisdom is not the exclusive privilege of kings and heroes; rather, it is the capacity to see the human being beyond power, lineage, and passion. Women such as Sindokht, Faranak, Farangis, Katayun, and Gordieh demonstrate that the greatest heroic action is not always the killing of an enemy. Sometimes, saving a child, preventing a war, speaking the truth to a king, or standing against the anger of one’s own kin represents a higher form of heroism حکیم ابوالقاسم فردوسی دراثر بی نظیر خود شاهنامه روایتی معنا گرایانه از رویدادهای تاریخی و حماسی ایران زمین دارد . در تمام داستان های فردوسی زنان نقشی بزرگ و یا کوچک داشته اند و تقریبا هیچ داستانی بدون حضور زنان پایان نیافته است. به روایت فردوسی، زنان شاهنامه در حوادث و حماسه ها نقش فعال و اغلب مثبتی داشته اند؛ تا آنجاکه از جایگاه رفیع و پرمنزلت اخلاقی برخوردارند. فردوسی در مقام یک حکیم به توصیف فضایل و نقش حکیمانه زنان در سطوح مختلف فردی ، خانوادگی و اجتماعی می پردازد و در این روایت بر اخلاق فضیلت گرا صحه میگذارد . در این شاهکار ادبی با زنانی روبرومی شویم که هرچند شخصیت های متنوع اخلاقی دارند اما بسیاری از آنها نمایشگر حیات حکیمانه و خردمندانه اند. در وجه دیگر حکمت یعنی تدبیر منزل و تدبیر خانواده با نقش آفرینی مهم ترین رکن خانواده، یعنی زنان شکل می گیرد . زنان خردمند شاهنامه در جایگاه های مختلف همسری و مادری و فرزندی نمونه های عالی رفتار و گفتار حکیمانه اند. همچنین از زنانی سخن رفته که به آیین کشورداری آگاه بودندو با تدبیر و تعقل به حکمرانی اهتمام داشتند. در این مقاله با نگاهی اجمالی به کنش ها و منشهای زنان شاهنامه برآنیم که ثابت کنیم تدبیر و خرد زنان شاهنامه در حوزه فردی و اخلاقی آنها خلاصه نشده و تدبیر آنها در صحنه اجتماع نیز طنین افکن است. زنان در عرصه خانواده و جامعه بزرگ تر آن دوشادوش مردان به اصلاح امور می پردازند.

https://cph.samt.ac.ir/article_740875_c4d804ee44ea941a23652fbf56f4039a.pdf