In contemporary philosophy, personal identity has become one of the central issues in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Many modern theories, especially within the analytic tradition, regard memory and psychological continuity as the basis of personal persistence. Nevertheless, this approach faces a fundamental question: can memory guarantee personal identity without presupposing an enduring unity of the self? Using an analytical-comparative method, this study examines the role of memory in the continuity of personal identity from the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and John Hick. Within the framework of his replication theory, Hick considers memory and continuity of consciousness the main elements of personal survival. However, this account encounters difficulties in explaining strict numerical identity because of problems such as forgetfulness, false memory, and the possibility of psychologically identical replicas. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, based on the principles of the primacy of existence, substantial motion, and particularly the immateriality of the imaginative faculty, interprets memory as a mode of the presence of cognitive forms within the immaterial soul. Accordingly, memory is not merely a psychological datum, but an existential dimension of the soul’s continuity. The findings show that the Sadrian account, by relating memory to the immaterial imagination and the persistence of the soul, provides a deeper explanation of personal identity. The originality of this study lies in its reinterpretation of memory through the theory of the immaterial imagination and its critical comparison with John Hick’s psychological approach.