Justice, as a foundational concept in philosophy, ethics, and education, has long attracted the attention of thinkers across various intellectual traditions. This study aims to comparatively examine the concept of justice in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Allameh Tabataba’i, and to analyze its educational implications. Employing a qualitative methodology and a comparative approach, data were collected through document analysis of the primary and interpretive works of both thinkers and analyzed using Brady’s four-stage model.

Findings indicate that justice in Levinas’s thought is ethically oriented, intersubjective, and pre-political, emerging from the encounter with the “Other” and the unconditional responsibility toward them. Within this framework, education is a moral and human process emphasizing the cultivation of ethical conscience, respect for differences, and responsiveness. In contrast, justice in Tabataba’i’s thought is rational, conventional, and rooted in human nature, defined within the context of social order and practical reason. Education in this view is a rational, ethical, and religious process aimed at holistic human development and the realization of ultimate perfection.

The comparison reveals that despite epistemological and teleological differences, there are notable similarities in their educational principles and moral training methods. Accordingly, a hybrid model is proposed that emphasizes both individual moral responsibility in encountering the Other and rational-social guidance toward human flourishing. This model can serve as a basis for rethinking educational policies, teacher training, and the design of justice-oriented curricula in contemporary educational systems