Abstract
This article comparatively analyzes the perspectives of Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) and Immanuel Kant on religious experience and divine knowledge. Mulla Sadra, drawing upon his ontological foundations such as the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), substantial motion of the soul, and unmediated knowledge (ilm huduri), posits the possibility of direct and intuitive apprehension of God as the pinnacle of human cognition. In contrast, Kant, with his critical epistemology, delineates the limits of theoretical reason for metaphysical knowledge, including that of God, deeming any theoretical knowledge of the transcendent realm impossible. Nevertheless, Kant opens the door for moral faith in God within the domain of practical reason. This comparison reveals that despite both philosophers acknowledging the limitations of pure discursive reason, their approaches ultimately lead to fundamentally different conclusions regarding the possibility and nature of divine knowledge. These disparities highlight the richness of discussions in the philosophy of religion and Islamic philosophy when confronting this fundamental question And it leaves the way open for further exploration.

Introduction
Throughout its long history, philosophy has persistently sought to unravel the mysteries of existence, knowledge, and humanity's place within the cosmos. Among these enduring inquiries, the question of religious experience and the possibility of divine knowledge has remained one of the most fundamental concerns for philosophers, both in the East and the West. This question is not merely an abstract philosophical puzzle; it is intimately tied to the spiritual life of human beings and is interwoven with the most basic issues of epistemology and ontology. The importance of this discussion is magnified in the contemporary world, where modern individuals grapple with numerous intellectual challenges concerning the relationship between religion and rationality. Thus, examining the profound reflections of philosophers who have ventured into this domain can provide valuable guidance.
This article aims to compare and analyze the perspectives of two of the greatest thinkers in the history of philosophy: Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi (Mulla Sadra), the eminent philosopher of the Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikmah al-Muta'aliyah) in the Islamic world, and Immanuel Kant, the prominent figure of critical philosophy in the West, concerning religious experience and divine knowledge. Mulla Sadra, relying on the rich tradition of Islamic philosophy and theoretical mysticism, established a philosophical system in which inner intuition and experiential knowledge play a central role in attaining existential truths, including the divine reality. In contrast, Kant, through his Copernican revolution in epistemology, meticulously delineated the boundaries of theoretical reason and rejected the possibility of any metaphysical knowledge of the "thing in itself" (noumenon), although he did open a path for moral faith in God.
The central question addressed in this article is: How do Mulla Sadra and Kant, despite their fundamentally different epistemological and ontological frameworks and their existence in entirely distinct intellectual contexts, address the issue of religious experience and the possibility of divine knowledge? And what fundamental similarities and differences exist in their approaches, both in theoretical and practical dimensions? This comparative analysis not only illuminates the intellectual dimensions of these two philosophers but also contributes to a deeper understanding of the place of reason, experience, and faith in the knowledge of absolute truth. To answer these questions, the article first explains the epistemological and ontological foundations of Mulla Sadra, focusing on concepts such as the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud), substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah), the levels of perception, and the role of immediate knowledge (ilm huduri) and mystical intuition in attaining divine knowledge. It then describes Kant's epistemological foundations, including the Copernican revolution, the limits of theoretical reason, the role of categories of understanding and ideas of pure reason, and the place of moral faith in religion. Finally, it engages in a comparative analysis of the two philosophers' views, highlighting points of convergence and divergence.

Research Methodology
This study employs a comparative-analytical methodology to examine the philosophical views of Mulla Sadra and Immanuel Kant regarding religious experience and divine knowledge. The research is qualitative in nature and relies on textual analysis of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include Mulla Sadra's magnum opus, *Al-Asfar al-Arba'ah* (The Four Intellectual Journeys), and Kant's three Critiques: *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, and *Critique of Judgment*. Secondary sources encompass scholarly commentaries, critical studies, and interpretations of both philosophers' works.
The comparative method involves a systematic examination of the epistemological and ontological foundations of each philosopher, followed by an analysis of their specific views on religious experience and divine knowledge. The analysis proceeds through three stages: first, a detailed exposition of each philosopher's relevant doctrines within their respective philosophical systems; second, an identification of points of convergence and divergence; and third, an interpretive discussion of the significance of these similarities and differences for understanding the broader philosophical traditions they represent. The methodology is interpretive and hermeneutical, seeking to understand each philosopher's position on its own terms before engaging in comparison. The comparative framework is structured around key themes: the nature and limits of human reason, the possibility of immediate or intuitive knowledge of God, the role of religious experience, and the practical implications of divine knowledge for human life and morality.

Discussion
Epistemological Foundations: The Primacy of Existence versus the Copernican Revolution
The fundamental divergence between Mulla Sadra and Kant begins at the level of their epistemological and ontological foundations. For Mulla Sadra, the principle of the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud) constitutes the cornerstone of his entire philosophical system. He asserts that existence alone has objective reality; essence (mahiyyah) is merely a conceptual abstraction that exists only in the mind (Shirazi, 1360, vol. 1, p. 31). This doctrine has profound implications for epistemology: if existence is primary, then genuine knowledge must be directed toward existence and its levels. Knowledge of essences without understanding their relationship to existence remains incomplete and superficial. Furthermore, Mulla Sadra affirms the graded unity of existence (tashkik al-wujud), viewing existence as a single reality possessing degrees of intensity and weakness, perfection and deficiency (Shirazi, 1360, vol. 1, p. 34). From the absolute, infinite existence of God to the lowest levels of material existence, all are manifestations of one graded reality. This graded structure provides the foundation for understanding different levels of knowledge and the possibility of the soul's ascent from lower to higher levels of existence.
In contrast, Kant's Copernican revolution inverts the traditional relationship between subject and object. He proposes that objects must conform to our cognitive faculties rather than our faculties conforming to objects (Kant, 1787, A11/B25). This paradigm shift means that we do not know things as they are in themselves (noumena) but only as they appear to us through the a priori forms of our sensibility (space and time) and the categories of our understanding. This fundamental limitation restricts human knowledge to the realm of possible experience and calls into question any claim to knowledge beyond sensory experience. Kant divides human cognition into three faculties: sensibility (the receptive capacity for sensory intuitions), understanding (the faculty of concepts and judgments through categories), and reason (the highest cognitive faculty seeking systematic unity and producing transcendent ideas). The categories of understanding—twelve a priori concepts such as causality, substance, and unity—are conditions for any possible experience and cannot be applied beyond the phenomenal realm to noumenal entities (Kant, 1787, A80/B106). This directly impacts the possibility of divine knowledge, since God belongs to the noumenal realm beyond all possible sensory experience. Kant concludes that human reason inevitably produces three transcendental ideas—God (the unconditioned unity of all conditions), the soul (the absolute unity of the thinking subject), and the world (the totality of phenomena)—but these ideas have only regulative, not constitutive, use. They guide the understanding toward systematic unity but do not provide knowledge of their objects (Kant, 1787, A334/B391).
Immediate versus Mediated Knowledge: Huduri Knowledge versus Conceptual Knowledge
A central distinction in Mulla Sadra's epistemology is between acquired knowledge (ilm husuli) and immediate knowledge (ilm huduri). Acquired knowledge occurs through the representation of an object in the mind via concepts and forms. Most conventional sciences belong to this category. However, divine knowledge and existential truths cannot be adequately grasped through acquired knowledge alone, which always remains limited and indirect. Immediate knowledge, in contrast, is knowledge of a thing by its very presence without the mediation of forms or concepts. In this type of knowledge, the very existence of the known is present to the knower (Shirazi, 1360, vol. 3, p. 313). Examples include the soul's knowledge of itself, the cause's knowledge of its effect, and God's knowledge of His creation. Mulla Sadra maintains that existential truths, especially the reality of God, can only be apprehended through immediate knowledge (ilm huduri). True, unmediated knowledge of God is only possible through intuition and the unification of the intellect and the intelligible (Shirazi, 1370, vol. 6, p. 113). Acquired knowledge can provide concepts about God but cannot grasp His existential reality. This immediate knowledge represents the pinnacle of human cognition and constitutes the basis of religious experience.
Kant's epistemology, while acknowledging different cognitive faculties, operates entirely within the framework of mediated, conceptual knowledge. For Kant, all human knowledge begins with sensory intuition and is structured by the categories of understanding. The application of concepts (categories) to sensory intuitions is what constitutes objective experience and knowledge. Any claim to immediate, non-sensory knowledge of transcendent realities falls outside the bounds of possible experience and, for Kant, is a transcendental illusion (Kant, 1787, A334/B391). Kant does not recognize a faculty of immediate intellectual intuition that could apprehend noumenal realities. While he acknowledges the idea of a possible intellectual intuition, he insists that such intuition is not available to human beings, who are dependent on sensory receptivity. The possibility of immediate knowledge of God is thus categorically denied within the limits of theoretical reason.
The Nature and Role of Religious Experience: Mystical Intuition versus Moral Faith
For Mulla Sadra, religious experience—understood as mystical intuition and theophanic vision—represents the highest and most authentic form of knowledge. Through the soul's substantial motion, its purification, and its ascent through the levels of perception, the soul can transcend mere sensory and rational cognition and attain direct, unmediated awareness of the divine presence. In this state, the veils between the seeker and the divine reality are removed, and the seeker not only "knows" that existence is one but "experiences" and "witnesses" that all existence is the manifestation of that singular reality. This is the essence of genuine religious experience and immediate knowledge of divine truths (Shirazi, 1360, vol. 8, p. 302). In Mulla Sadra's philosophy, religious experience is not merely an emotional or psychological state but a certain, immediate, and existential mode of knowing that surpasses all forms of discursive reasoning. This experience is the ultimate goal of the soul's cognitive journey—a direct encounter with the divine reality through the existential unification of the soul with the very ground of being.
For Kant, religious experience in the sense of direct, sensory or intellectual intuition of the divine is impossible. Any claim to such experience constitutes a transcendental illusion arising from the illegitimate application of categories to the noumenal realm. However, Kant does not eliminate the significance of religion or the human relationship with the divine. Instead, he relocates this relationship to the domain of practical reason and morality. The demand for religious faith arises not from theoretical curiosity or mystical longing but from the moral law's requirements. To make sense of the moral law and the pursuit of the highest good—the synthesis of virtue and happiness—we must postulate the existence of God as the guarantor of this synthesis and the immortality of the soul as the condition for its attainment (Kant, 1788, A225-A232). Kant's "religious experience" is thus the experience of the moral law within us and the rational faith that arises from it—a faith grounded in the categorical imperative rather than in mystical visions or ontological proofs.
The Limits of Reason and the Path to Transcendence
Both philosophers acknowledge some form of limitation to human reason in its capacity to apprehend ultimate reality through pure argumentation. Mulla Sadra, while valuing philosophical demonstrations, maintains that their scope is inherently limited. Philosophical reasoning and acquired knowledge can lead one to the threshold of divine knowledge but cannot penetrate its essence (Shirazi, 1360, vol. 3, p. 302). The pinnacle of understanding is not discursive reasoning but contemplative vision and immediate knowledge. Kant's critique of pure reason demonstrates the inherent limits of theoretical reason in metaphysical matters. He systematically rejects the three classical proofs for God's existence—the ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological arguments—demonstrating that they each fall into logical fallacies and transcendental illusions by applying categories beyond their legitimate domain (Kant, 1787, A590/B618). Theoretical reason, on its own, cannot establish the existence of God or provide any positive knowledge of the divine.
The paths to transcendence diverge significantly. For Mulla Sadra, the path to divine knowledge is the soul's existential transformation through substantial motion. This path begins with sensory perception, progresses through intellectual abstraction, and culminates in intuitive vision. It is a path that demands both intellectual rigor and spiritual purification, as the soul's ascent is both a cognitive and existential journey. The soul, being bodily in origin but spiritual in subsistence (jismaniyyah al-huduth wa ruhaniyyah al-baqa'), undergoes continuous transformation until it attains the level of complete abstraction and existential union with the divine (Shirazi, 1360, vol. 8, p. 100). This transformation enables the soul to receive divine illuminations and experience immediate knowledge of God. In Kant's philosophy, the path to transcendence is not existential but moral. It is through the categorical imperative and the free, rational will that the human being encounters the divine. The moral law within us (the categorical imperative) and the starry heavens above us (the natural world) are, for Kant, the two sources of reverence and the pathway to a rational faith in God. Transcendence, for Kant, lies not in overcoming the limitations of theoretical reason but in recognizing the legitimacy of practical reason's postulates beyond those limitations.

Conclusion
This comparative study has examined the philosophical perspectives of Mulla Sadra and Immanuel Kant on religious experience and the possibility of divine knowledge. The fundamental divergence between these two philosophers begins with their epistemological foundations. Mulla Sadra, grounded in the primacy of existence, the graded unity of being, and the theory of the soul's substantial motion, affirms the possibility of direct, immediate knowledge of God through mystical intuition and existential unification with the divine. This knowledge, achieved through the soul's ascent and purification, represents the highest form of human cognition—a certain, immediate, and existential encounter with divine reality. In contrast, Kant, through his Copernican revolution and critical epistemology, limits theoretical reason to the realm of phenomena and denies the possibility of any theoretical knowledge of the noumenal, including God. While he rejects all theoretical proofs for God's existence and any claim to immediate, non-sensory knowledge, he does not eliminate the significance of religion. Instead, Kant locates the relationship with the divine in the domain of practical reason through the concept of moral faith—a rational faith grounded in the moral law's requirements.
Both philosophers, in their own ways, recognize the limits of purely discursive reason in attaining absolute truth, but their solutions diverge radically. For Mulla Sadra, the solution is the soul's existential and cognitive ascent toward mystical vision and immediate knowledge. For Kant, the solution is the recognition of the moral law's authority and the rational faith in God that follows from it. These differences reflect not only contrasting philosophical methodologies but also the broader distinctions between the traditions of Islamic philosophy, which integrates rational demonstration with mystical intuition, and Western critical philosophy, which carefully delineates the boundaries of human cognition and finds God within the moral law rather than in metaphysical speculation. This comparative analysis demonstrates that the question of religious experience and divine knowledge remains a rich and enduring philosophical inquiry that transcends cultural and historical boundaries. The study of these two great philosophers' reflections on this question provides valuable insights into the complex relationship between reason, experience, and faith. It also highlights the importance of cross-cultural philosophical dialogue in addressing fundamental human questions about the nature of reality and the possibility of encountering the divine.