The problem of evil is one of the most fundamental challenges in the philosophy of religion and has often been described as the strongest argument against classical theism. It arises from the apparent incompatibility between the existence of moral and natural evils and the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. In contemporary philosophy of religion, alongside the logical problem of evil, the evidential or probabilistic problem—most notably advanced by William Rowe—has gained particular prominence. In response, the position known as skeptical theism has been developed, emphasizing the cognitive limitations of human beings in grasping God’s reasons and purposes for permitting evil. This paper offers an analytic and critical examination of skeptical theism through the views of three of its leading proponents: Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergman, and William Alston. It is argued that although skeptical theism aims to block the inference from “we see no justifying reason for evil” to “there is no justifying reason,” it ultimately relies on epistemic humility in a way that fails to provide a persuasive response to non-theistic critics. The paper concludes that skeptical theism does not successfully resolve the problem of moral and natural evil; rather, it leads to a form of agnosticism about divine attributes and purposes, rendering it insufficient as a rational defense of classical theism against the problem of evil. Then considers the free will defense with some reservations and the best possible world theodicy with a reservation as convincing answers to the problem of evil