The question of resurrection in philosophy of religion and comparative theology is not merely concerned with life after death; rather, it is closely connected with divine justice, moral responsibility, and the relation between human action and its final consequence. Adopting a comparative and problem-oriented approach, this article compares Paul Tillich’s existential-symbolic interpretation of resurrection with Islamic wisdom through four axes: ontological, linguistic, teleological, and ethical, with particular emphasis on the Avicennian account of the survival of the soul and the Sadrian account of the otherworldly body and the embodiment of deeds. In Tillich’s theology, resurrection is understood less as a spatial and future-oriented event than as a mode of existential fulfillment in relation to the Absolute. Concepts such as reward, punishment, heaven, and hell are therefore interpreted as existential symbols of reconciliation, fulfillment, rupture, and alienation. The findings of the study show that the main critique of Tillich is not directed at the symbolic nature of eschatological language as such, since Islamic wisdom also moves beyond a literalistic and material understanding of resurrection. The point of disagreement arises where the symbolization of resurrection leads to the weakening of the eschatological reality of the consequences of human actions; in that case, explaining final justice, moral responsibility, and the deterrent function of resurrection becomes difficult. By contrast, Islamic wisdom, by emphasizing the ontological connection between action, the soul, acquired dispositions, and their otherworldly manifestation, provides a more coherent account of the relation between resurrection, divine justice, and religious ethics.