Abstract
This study offers a comparative investigation of consciousness, and tasbih in the Qur’an vis à vis Panpsychism in the philosophy of mind. The Qur’an repeatedly speaks of cognition and tasbih among all entities, granting every element of existence life and undestanding. By contrast, Panpsychists claim that consciousness inheres in all particles of matter. Employing descriptive, analytical, and comparative methods, this paper argues that the principal challenges to Panpsychism—such as explaining mental causation in harmony with causal closure, and the combination problem—stem from its physicalist basis. These difficulties are irrelevant to the Qur’anic view, which rests on transcendence; a coherent account of Panpsychism is only attainable through recognition of the metaphysical dimension. Findings indicate that the Qur’an and Panpsychism both affirm universal consciousness but differ profoundly in ontological foundations. In Qur’anic thought, every atom of being is a creation of Divine Wisdom, and the consciousness and tasbih of creatures are purposive acts directed toward the recognition and praise of God, for every being possesses a share of knowledge and life in proportion to the degree of its participation in Being. Panpsychism, however, considers universal consciousness a merely natural property, devoid of divine orientation, arising from structural features of matter and governed by physicalism and causal closure. Thus, the similarity between Qur’anic thought and Panpsychism regarding consciousness is only verbal, not conceptual; they share language but not essence, therefore the two should not be regarded as identical.

Introduction
The nature and scope of consciousness constitute one of the most profound and enduring questions in both philosophy and theology. While contemporary philosophy of mind has grappled with the "hard problem of consciousness"—the challenge of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—the Qur'an presents a worldview in which consciousness permeate all levels of existence. The Qur'an repeatedly speaks of the glorification (tasbīḥ) of all creatures, attributing to every element of the cosmos a form of life, understanding, and purposeful praise of the Divine. This includes not only animals and plants but also inanimate objects such as mountains, stones, and celestial bodies, all of which are described as engaged in conscious worship of their Creator.
This Qur'anic vision finds an intriguing parallel in panpsychism, a philosophical position that has gained renewed attention in contemporary philosophy of mind. Panpsychism holds that consciousness or some form of mentality is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, present in all particles of matter. According to this view, even the most basic constituents of reality—electrons, quarks, atoms—possess some primitive form of subjectivity or experience. While this position offers a potential solution to the mind-body problem by avoiding both reductive physicalism and substance dualism, it faces significant philosophical challenges, including the combination problem and difficulties in explaining mental causation within a causally closed physical framework.
The apparent similarity between the Qur'anic affirmation of universal consciousness and the panpsychist claim of ubiquitous mentality raises important comparative questions. Do these two frameworks represent the same fundamental insight expressed in different languages? Or do they differ in their underlying ontological commitments, explanatory aims, and ultimate implications? The present study undertakes a comparative investigation of consciousness in the Qur'an and panpsychism, seeking to clarify both the points of convergence and the fundamental divergences between these two perspectives. The central research question asks: How does the concept of universal consciousness function within the Qur'anic worldview, and how does this compare with the philosophical claims of panpsychism? What are the ontological, teleological, and epistemological differences between these two frameworks?
The significance of this comparative study lies in its potential to illuminate the relationship between revealed religious knowledge and contemporary philosophical inquiry. By examining the Qur'anic perspective on universal consciousness alongside panpsychism, we can better understand the distinctive features of each framework, avoid the fallacy of equating them based on superficial linguistic similarities, and appreciate the unique contributions of each to our understanding of consciousness, existence, and the relationship between the created order and the Divine

Research Methodology
This research employs a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, structured around a problem-oriented approach rather than a theory-equating or worldview-equating framework. The comparative logic follows Oliver Freiberger's methodological model for comparative studies in religion, which emphasizes five key stages: (1) selection of sources and the "tertium comparationis" (common ground for comparison), (2) description of data, (3) juxtaposition, (4) redescription, and (5) rectification and theory formation. This approach enables systematic comparison while respecting the distinct conceptual horizons and epistemological foundations of each tradition.
The research adopts a problem-oriented comparative framework, focusing on the specific question of "the relationship between consciousness and the non-human world"—a question addressed in both religious scripture and contemporary philosophy of mind, albeit within different conceptual frameworks. The Qur'an is treated as a revealed text with its own ontological language, while panpsychism is examined as a philosophical position within the analytic tradition of philosophy of mind. The study does not assume that the Qur'an is a philosophical text nor that panpsychism constitutes a religious worldview; rather, it acknowledges the structural differences between religious and philosophical discourses while enabling a focused comparison at the level of conceptual function.
Data were collected through library research, drawing upon primary sources including the Qur'an with its classical and contemporary exegetical works (particularly the extensive commentary of Allameh Tabataba'i), foundational works in Islamic philosophy such as those of Mulla Sadra, and key texts in contemporary philosophy of mind The analysis proceeds through careful conceptual clarification, examination of arguments and counterarguments, and systematic comparison of the two frameworks across multiple dimensions including ontology, teleology, and explanatory scope.

Discussion
The Qur'anic Conception of Universal Consciousness and Glorification
The Qur'an contains numerous verses that explicitly or implicitly affirm the consciousness and of all creatures, including those conventionally regarded as inanimate. The concept of tasbīḥ (glorification) serves as the primary vehicle for this affirmation, with entire chapters of the Qur'an—known as the musabbiḥāt—opening with declarations that everything in the heavens and earth glorifies God. Verses such as "Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth glorifies Allah" (Qur'an, 59:1) and "The thunder glorifies His praise, and the angels too from awe of Him" (Qur'an, 13:13) indicate that glorification is not limited to conscious human beings or angels but extends throughout creation.
The Qur'an also speaks of the conscious obedience of apparently non-conscious entities: mountains and birds glorifying with David (Qur'an, 21:79), the earth and sky being commanded and obeying (Qur'an, 41:11), and inanimate objects bearing witness on the Day of Judgment (Qur'an, 24:24; 36:65). These verses present a worldview in which the entire cosmos is alive, Conscious, and engaged in purposeful worship of its Creator.
Exegetical tradition has offered two main interpretive approaches to these verses. The first approach, represented by figures such as Fakhr[01l1] al-Dīn al-Razi, interprets the glorification of non-conscious beings metaphorically—as "the language of the state" (lisān al-ḥāl) rather than actual verbal glorification. According to this view, the order and design of creation point to the existence and unity of God, and this evidential role constitutes a form of metaphorical praise. The second approach, strongly defended by Allameh Tabataba'i and others, affirms that the glorification of all creatures is literal and real, not metaphorical. Tabataba'i argues that if the glorification were merely metaphorical, there would be no reason for the Qur'an to state that "you do not understand their glorification" (Qur'an, 17:44), since metaphorical glorification is readily understood by all. The very fact that human beings are said to be unable to comprehend this glorification indicates that it is a real form of speech and consciousness, though one that operates in a manner different from human language.
Tabataba'i develops a sophisticated philosophical defense of this view, drawing upon the principle of [01l1] systematic ambiguity of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd). He argues that just as existence admits of degrees, so too do the attributes of existence, including knowledge, life, will, and perception. Every being possesses knowledge and life in proportion to its share of existence; indeed, wherever creation extends, knowledge extends with it. This is not to say that all beings possess the same type or degree of knowledge, nor that they know everything that humans know; rather, each being has a level of consciousness appropriate to its ontological station. Tabataba'i explicitly addresses the objection that if non-human beings possess consciousness, they should display behavior similar to that of conscious animals. He responds that consciousness admits of varying degrees, and the effects of consciousness vary accordingly—just as human consciousness differs from animal consciousness, so too does the consciousness of plants and inanimate objects differ from that of animals.
The conception of speech (nuṭq) in the Qur'an receives similar treatment. Tabataba'i defines the reality of speech as the disclosure of what is in the heart, the revelation of one's inner meaning to others. This disclosure can occur through various means—spoken words, gestures, writing, or any other form of expression. Speech is not essentially tied to conventional human language; rather, any entity whose very existence expresses meaning and intention can be said to speak. This expansive understanding of language and communication enables the Qur'anic affirmation that all creatures possess a form of speech, language, and consciousness that is real, even if human beings cannot directly perceive it. The famous tradition of the pebbles glorifying in the hand of the Prophet Muhammad is interpreted by Tabataba'i not as a suspension of natural laws but as an opening of spiritual perception: the pebbles were always glorifying, and the Prophet's miracle consisted in enabling others to hear what is always present but ordinarily inaccessible to human senses.
Panpsychism: Definition, Arguments, and Challenges
Panpsychism, in its contemporary formulation, holds that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, present in all particles of matter. As David Skrbina defines it, panpsychism is the view that "all things have a mind, or mind-like qualities[01l1] ," whether these are understood as conscious experience, subjective qualities, or some form of proto-mentality. This position has ancient roots, appearing in various forms in both Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, but has received renewed attention in recent philosophy of mind as a potential solution to the mind-body problem.
Nagel’s argument involves four premises:
1. Material Composition—Living organisms are complex material systems with no immaterial parts. The matter composing us is not special; the matter composing any material entity, if broken down far enough and rearranged, could in principle be incorporated into a living organism.
2. Realism—Mental states are genuine properties of living organisms.
3. No Radical Emergence—All the properties of a complex organism are intelligibly derived from the properties of its parts.
4. Non-Reductionism—The mental states of an organism are not intelligibly derived from its physical properties alone (including the physical properties of its parts).
Nagel concludes from these premises that there must be non-physical properties of basic matter that, when combined in the right way, intelligibly imply the existence of mental states. It is worth noting that, although Nagel calls the resulting view “panpsychism”, it seems compatible with panprotopsychism (discussed above).
The second argument, advanced by Galen Strawson, contends that physicalism, properly understood, entails panpsychism. According to Strawson, all mental events are physical, and physicalism requires that the ultimate constituents of reality possess some intrinsic nature. If mental phenomena are real and physical, then the qualities of conscious experience must be properties of fundamental physical entities. The alternative—that consciousness emerges from entirely non-conscious matter—requires positing a form of radical emergence that is conceptually obscure and lacks explanatory power.
Panpsychism faces several significant challenges. The first is the "combination problem," widely regarded as the most serious difficulty for the view. The problem concerns how the experiences of many "micro-subjects" (such as fundamental particles) combine to form the unified conscious experience of a "macro-subject" (such as a human being). Unlike the way bricks combine to form a house, or molecules combine to form a liquid, the combination of conscious experiences into a unified consciousness is difficult to understand. Some panpsychists, such as William Seager, have proposed "emergent panpsychism" as a solution, suggesting that micro-experiences combine and transform into macro-experiences, but critics argue that this merely replaces one mystery with another.
The second challenge concerns mental causation within a causally closed physical framework. If the physical world is causally closed—meaning that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause—then how can mental states have any causal influence on the physical world? Panpsychists respond that if consciousness is intrinsic to matter, then mental causation is part of the physical system rather than a problematic intervention from outside. However, this response depends on the validity of causal closure, a principle that is itself controversial and challenged from multiple philosophical and theological perspectives.
A third challenge involves the intuitive implausibility of attributing consciousness to fundamental particles. Many philosophers and laypeople find it deeply counterintuitive to suppose that electrons, quarks, or atoms possess any form of conscious experience. Panpsychists respond by pointing to other counterintuitive yet well-established scientific claims, such as the relativity of time, arguing that intuitive resistance is not a reliable guide to truth. However, critics contend that the radical counterintuitiveness of panpsychism, combined with its other difficulties, renders it a less attractive option than alternative approaches.
Comparative Analysis: Points of Convergence and Divergence
A systematic comparison between the Qur'anic perspective and panpsychism reveals both significant points of convergence and fundamental divergences. Points of Convergence: Both frameworks affirm the ubiquity of consciousness or beyond the human realm. Both reject reductive physicalist accounts that would reduce consciousness to mere chemical or mechanical processes. Both recognize consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality that cannot be dismissed or explained away. Both acknowledge that human beings may be incapable of fully understanding or perceiving the forms of consciousness present in other beings.
Points of Divergence: The ontological foundations of the two views are fundamentally different. Panpsychism is a philosophical position arising from the attempt to solve the mind-body problem within a physicalist framework; it treats consciousness as an intrinsic property of matter. The Qur'anic view, by contrast, is a revealed perspective grounded in divine creation and purposeful design; consciousness in the Qur'an is not an intrinsic property of matter but a gift from the Creator, an expression of divine will and wisdom. Every particle of creation is a creature of God, and its consciousness and glorification are directed toward the recognition and praise of the Creator.
The teleological orientation of consciousness also differs radically. In the Qur'anic view, the consciousness and glorification of all creatures are purposeful: they are directed toward the knowledge and praise of God. Every being, in its own way and to the extent of its ontological capacity, participates in the universal worship of the Creator. In panpsychism, by contrast, universal consciousness is devoid of any transcendent orientation; it is simply a natural property of matter that arises from the structure of nature itself. There is no inherent direction toward the divine, no purposeful recognition of a Creator.
The explanatory contexts of the two views are also distinct. Panpsychism is a response to the explanatory gap in contemporary philosophy of mind—the failure of reductive physicalism to account for subjective experience. It represents a philosophical attempt to solve a specific problem within the Western analytic tradition. The Qur'anic view, by contrast, arises from a comprehensive theological and ontological framework in which all existence is understood through the lens of divine creation, order, and purpose. The Qur'an's affirmation of universal consciousness is not offered as a solution to a philosophical puzzle but as a revelation of the deeper structure of reality.
Panpsychism, as articulated by contemporary philosophers, is often motivated by the need to explain mental causation in a way consistent with the principle of causal closure—the principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. The Qur'anic view, however, operates within a framework of divine sovereignty and transcendence that contradicts any such closure. From the Islamic perspective, the physical world is one of many worlds created by God; it is not closed or self-sufficient but is continuously sustained and governed by divine will. Therefore, the Qur'anic affirmation of universal consciousness does not require, and is not constrained by, the principle of causal closure.
A crucial implication of this analysis is that the apparent similarity between the Qur'anic view and panpsychism is at best a verbal similarity, not a conceptual or ontological one. Both use terms such as "consciousness" and to describe non-human entities, but the meanings of these terms, their ontological grounding, their explanatory function, and their ultimate implications are radically different. To equate the Qur'anic view with panpsychism would be to commit the fallacy of equivocation, treating linguistic convergence as evidence of conceptual identity.

Conclusion
This comparative study has examined the concept of consciousness in the Qur'an and panpsychism, revealing both points of convergence and fundamental divergence. The Qur'an affirms that all creatures possess consciousness, language, and glorification, rooted in their ontological participation in existence and their purposeful orientation toward God. Panpsychism affirms that consciousness is ubiquitous, present in all particles of matter, arising from the intrinsic nature of physical reality. Both reject reductive physicalism and acknowledge the reality of consciousness beyond the human realm.
However, the two frameworks differ fundamentally in their ontological foundations, teleological orientation, and explanatory contexts. The Qur'anic view is grounded in divine creation, systematic ambiguity of existence, and the purposeful worship of the Creator; it affirms that every being possesses knowledge and life in proportion to its share of existence, and that its glorification is a real, conscious act of praise. Panpsychism is grounded in philosophical naturalism and physicalist commitments; it treats consciousness as an intrinsic property of matter, devoid of transcendent orientation or purpose. The Qur'anic view operates within a framework of divine sovereignty and transcendence, while panpsychism operates within a framework of causal closure and naturalistic explanation.
The analysis demonstrates that the apparent similarity between the Qur'anic perspective and panpsychism regarding universal consciousness is merely verbal, not conceptual. To equate them would be to overlook their profound ontological, teleological, and explanatory differences. The Qur'anic view of universal consciousness is not a philosophical theory to be evaluated by the same criteria as panpsychism; it is a revealed affirmation of the depth and meaning of creation, oriented toward the recognition and praise of the Divine. This comparative study thus contributes to a deeper understanding of both frameworks and highlights the importance of careful conceptual analysis in comparative theology and philosophy.