Abstract
Carl Rogers' person-centered theory, as a humanistic school of psychotherapy, centers on the concepts of "self-actualization" and "the actualizing tendency," proposing specific ethical foundations for the therapeutic relationship and human valuation. This article employs an analytical-comparative method to examine and critique these foundations from the ethical viewpoint of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a prominent representative of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy (al-hikmah al-muta‘āliyah) with an Islamic approach. The findings indicate that while Rogers' emphasis on client respect, unconditional empathy, and positive regard is also valued from an Islamic ethical perspective, the axiological foundations of his theory—particularly the ethical relativism stemming from the absolute authority of individual subjective experience, the organismic self-regulation, the absence of divine teleology for human beings, and the definition of the "self" as an autonomous entity inclined toward self-actualization apart from a relationship with God—are in fundamental conflict with Mesbah Yazdi's ethical framework. The latter is grounded in moral realism, the divine innate nature (fiṭrah) of humans, and the purposiveness of creation centered on servitude to God and spiritual proximity to Him. This critique not only reveals the philosophical shortcomings of Rogers' theory but also demonstrates the capacity of the Islamic ethical system to provide a more comprehensive framework for helping relationships—one that preserves human dignity while guiding individuals toward their true perfection.

Introduction
Carl Rogers' client-centered therapy, as one of the most influential humanistic approaches in modern psychotherapy, represents a significant paradigm shift in understanding the therapeutic relationship and human nature. Central to Rogers' theory are the concepts of "self-actualization" and the "actualizing tendency," which propose that human beings possess an innate drive toward growth, fulfillment, and the realization of their inherent potential. This framework establishes specific ethical foundations for the therapeutic relationship and human valuation, emphasizing unconditional positive regard, empathy, congruence, and the absolute authority of the client's subjective experience as the ultimate guide for decision-making and value assessment.
Rogers' person-centered approach has been widely adopted in counseling and psychotherapy training centers worldwide, including in Iran. However, the increasing application of Western psychological theories in Islamic cultural contexts raises important questions about the compatibility of their underlying philosophical and ethical assumptions with Islamic moral frameworks. Despite Rogers' significant influence, the ethical foundations of his theory—particularly its axiological commitments regarding moral relativism, the nature of human flourishing, and the relationship between the individual and transcendent reality—have not been subjected to systematic philosophical critique from an Islamic ethical perspective, especially compared to other major theories such as Ellis's rational emotive behavior therapy or Freud's psychoanalysis.
The present study addresses this gap by examining and critiquing the ethical foundations of Rogers' client-centered theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi (d. 2021), a prominent contemporary Islamic philosopher and representative of Mulla Sadra's transcendent philosophy (al-hikmah al-muta'aliyah). Misbah Yazdi's ethical framework is grounded in moral realism, the divine innate nature (fiṭrah) of human beings, and the purposiveness of creation centered on servitude to God and spiritual proximity to the Divine. His comprehensive system integrates rational inquiry, scriptural revelation, and mystical insight to articulate a normative ethics that addresses both individual flourishing and social responsibility.
The central research question guiding this inquiry is: What are the fundamental critiques that Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework offers against the axiological and ethical foundations of Rogers' client-centered theory, and how can this critique inform the development of culturally appropriate and ethically grounded approaches to psychotherapy in Islamic contexts? By engaging in this critical dialogue, the research seeks to clarify the points of convergence and divergence between humanistic psychology's emphasis on individual autonomy and Islamic ethics' commitment to divine teleology and moral objectivity. The findings aim to demonstrate both the philosophical shortcomings of Rogers' secular humanistic framework and the capacity of Islamic ethics to provide a more comprehensive foundation for helping relationships that preserves human dignity while guiding individuals toward their true perfection.

Research Methodology
This research employs a descriptive-analytical and critical methodology, situated within the framework of qualitative philosophical inquiry. The study proceeds in two distinct phases to systematically examine and critique the ethical foundations of Rogers' client-centered theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework.
In the first phase, Rogers' axiological and ethical views were comprehensively extracted from primary and secondary sources using a library-based approach. Key texts examined include Rogers' major works, including On Becoming a Person (1961), Client-Centered Therapy (1951), and A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships (1959), as well as secondary commentaries and critical analyses. The collected materials were systematically organized around core themes including the locus of evaluation, the organismic valuing process, self-actualization, unconditional positive regard, and the nature of the autonomous self.
In the second phase, Misbah Yazdi's ethical views were examined through his extensive corpus, including his multi-volume works Ethics in the Qur'an (1389/2010), The Philosophy of Ethics (1388/2009), Critique and Examination of Ethical Schools (1392/2013), and his pedagogical works on Islamic ethics and philosophy. His framework was systematically compared with Rogers' positions, with particular attention to fundamental categories such as the nature of moral knowledge, the source and objectivity of values, the teleology of human existence, the concept of human nature (fiṭrah), the relationship between reason and revelation, and the practical implications of each framework for the therapeutic relationship.
The comparative analysis follows a critical approach, treating Rogers' theory not as an equal dialogue partner but as a secular framework to be evaluated against Islamic ethical principles. The method enables both identification of points of agreement—such as the value of empathy, respect for persons, and unconditional positive regard—and articulation of fundamental incompatibilities regarding moral relativism, the nature of human flourishing, and the relationship between human beings and the Divine. The study culminates in a practical comparison of the therapeutic implications of each ethical framework, presented through systematic tables that clarify the divergent goals, roles, and methods of secular humanistic versus Islamic faith-based counseling approaches.

Discussion
The Ethical Foundations of Rogers' Client-Centered Theory
Rogers' client-centered theory is built upon several interconnected ethical and philosophical foundations that collectively constitute its distinctive axiological framework. The first and most fundamental principle is the absolute authority of subjective experience as the ultimate criterion for value judgment and moral decision-making. Rogers asserts that the "organismic experience" of each individual serves as the final arbiter of right and wrong, good and bad, and that no external authority—whether traditional morality, religion, cultural norms, or even the therapist—has the right to impose values upon the client. This principle establishes radical phenomenological subjectivism as the epistemological foundation of the theory, affirming that the only reality accessible to human beings is their own internal world of perceptions, feelings, and meanings. From this perspective, behavior is determined not by objective reality but by the individual's subjective perception of reality, and each person lives within their own unique and private phenomenal field. This commitment to phenomenology as both a method and an ontological stance leads inevitably to ethical relativism, as different individuals operating from different experiential worlds will inevitably arrive at different, equally valid moral judgments.
The second ethical foundation is "organismic self-regulation as the basis of action", articulated through Rogers' concept of the "organismic valuing process." According to Rogers, human beings possess an innate, biological capacity to evaluate experiences and actions based on whether they promote or inhibit self-actualization. This process serves as a built-in guidance system that helps individuals distinguish between growth-enhancing and growth-inhibiting experiences, provided that the individual is free from the distorting influences of externally imposed "conditions of worth." The organismic valuing process is characterized as fluid, dynamic, and context-sensitive, operating through a continuous feedback mechanism wherein experiences are symbolized and evaluated according to the satisfaction they provide to the organism. Under optimal environmental conditions—characterized by unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding—this intrinsic valuing process enables individuals to make choices that genuinely serve their well-being and growth.
The third ethical foundation is the "inherent tendency toward self-actualization" as the intrinsic moral direction of human life. Rogers posits that human beings are born with a fundamental drive toward growth, autonomy, and the full realization of their potential capacities. This actualizing tendency is presented as a universal, biologically-based characteristic of all living organisms, serving as the central motivating force behind all human activity. The actualizing tendency directs organisms toward the enhancement and preservation of self, guiding them toward greater complexity, integration, and fulfillment. From this perspective, ethical behavior is defined as behavior that aligns with this innate tendency and supports the organism's continued growth and development. The good is thus identified with what is growth-promoting for the individual, and evil with what obstructs or damages the organism's capacity for flourishing. This identification of the good with biological growth and psychological integration represents a form of naturalistic reductionism that eliminates any transcendent or objective moral standard beyond the individual organism's self-referential experience.
The fourth ethical foundation is unconditional positive regard and non-judgmental acceptance, which establishes the therapist's stance as ethically neutral and value-free. Rogers insists that the therapist must accept the client's intrinsic worth regardless of their behaviors, beliefs, or choices, refraining from any form of moral judgment or evaluative commentary. This principle reflects the broader humanistic commitment to individual autonomy and the belief that external judgment—whether positive or negative—interferes with the client's natural growth process. The therapeutic relationship thus becomes a space completely free from external moral constraints, where the client can explore their feelings and choices without fear of criticism or rejection.
Finally, Rogers' theory posits the human being as a self-grounding, autonomous entity, for whom the ultimate telos is "becoming one's real self." This real self is defined as a self free from externally imposed conditions of worth, guided entirely by the organism's own valuing process. Human autonomy, in this framework, is understood as absolute self-determination, freedom from all external constraints and influences, and the capacity to choose one's own values and direction independent of any transcendent reference. The good life, for Rogers, consists in this autonomous self-realization, the full expression of one's unique potentialities without interference or guidance from any authority beyond the individual's own experience.
Misbah Yazdi's Islamic Ethical Framework
Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi's ethical framework provides a comprehensive alternative rooted in Islamic metaphysics, epistemology, and teleology. At its core is the principle of moral realism and innate recognition (fiṭrī cognition) , which holds that moral judgments possess objective truth value and are discoverable through the innate, intuitive capacities of human reason. The human being is created with a "divine nature" (fiṭrah) that includes natural inclinations toward truth, justice, compassion, and the recognition of God's existence and sovereignty. This fiṭrah serves as the epistemological foundation for moral knowledge, enabling human beings to recognize the intrinsic goodness of justice and the intrinsic evil of oppression without requiring external instruction. Moral realism establishes that ethical propositions are truth-apt, that they refer to objective features of reality, and that rational argument can provide legitimate grounds for moral claims. This stands in direct opposition to moral relativism, which, according to Misbah Yazdi, leads to dangerous consequences including the collapse of meaningful moral discourse, the inability to criticize objectively wrong actions, the relativization of all moral values to individual preference or social convention, and ultimately the erosion of the ethical foundations of human life.
Second, Misbah Yazdi grounds ethics in the concept of fiṭrah as the foundational structure of human nature. Fiṭrah refers to the set of cognitive, emotional, and practical inclinations that God has placed within human beings, directing them toward their true perfection and ultimate happiness. These innate dispositions are stable, universal, and unchanging, reflecting the consistent nature of human creation across time and culture. The ethical good consists in actions that align with and actualize this divine fiṭrah, while moral evil consists in deviation from and suppression of it. Unlike Rogers' purely naturalistic conception of a growth tendency, the Islamic concept of fiṭrah is inherently theistic and teleological, oriented toward the recognition and worship of God as the ultimate purpose of human existence. This orientation provides a substantive, objective content to ethical values, grounding them in the nature of human creation and the divine purpose for human life, rather than in individual subjective preference.
Third, Misbah Yazdi emphasizes the teleological orientation of human life toward divine proximity (qurb ilā Allāh). The ultimate purpose of human existence, the final end toward which all ethical striving must be directed, is spiritual proximity to God and the attainment of divine pleasure (riḍwān). Ethical virtues derive their value from their capacity to facilitate this journey toward divine proximity, and moral actions are evaluated according to their contribution to this end. The final good, the highest perfection of which human beings are capable, consists in the complete actualization of their God-given potentialities through conscious, chosen submission to the divine will and the cultivation of virtues that bring the soul closer to its Creator. This teleological orientation ensures that ethics is neither arbitrary nor self-referential but is anchored in the objective structure of reality, the nature of human creation, and the divine purpose for human existence.
Fourth, Misbah Yazdi articulates the integral relationship between reason, revelation, and ethics. Practical reason possesses the capacity to recognize fundamental moral principles and to discern the general contours of ethical life. However, reason alone is insufficient for the comprehensive guidance required for human perfection; it must be supplemented and guided by divine revelation through the prophets and the scriptures. Revelation provides specific guidance on the detailed applications of ethical principles, clarifies the precise content of the virtues, establishes clear boundaries for action, and supplies the motivational and sanction-based reinforcement necessary for consistent ethical practice. The complete ethical system, therefore, is a synthesis of rational reflection and revealed guidance, neither reducible to the other but each fulfilling complementary roles in the realization of the ethical life.
Critical Analysis: Fundamental Incompatibilities
The comparative analysis reveals several fundamental incompatibilities between Rogers' secular humanistic ethics and Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework. First, the critique of moral relativism and the absolute authority of subjective experience: Rogers' commitment to subjective experience as the ultimate moral arbiter leads inevitably to ethical relativism and the dissolution of any objective standard for moral judgment. From Misbah Yazdi's perspective, this position undermines the very possibility of meaningful ethical discourse, removes the basis for criticizing objectively wrong actions, and reduces morality to individual preference and social convention. The Islamic alternative, grounded in moral realism and innate fiṭrī cognition, affirms that moral judgments possess objective truth value, that human beings possess the capacity to recognize these truths through their divinely-endowed reason, and that ethical principles are universal and binding across individuals, cultures, and historical periods.
Second, the critique of naturalism and the reduction of human perfection to psychological self-actualization: Rogers' actualizing tendency, while apparently positive in its orientation, articulates a reductive and materialistic account of human flourishing that confines human perfection to the realization of biological and psychological potentials within the framework of worldly existence. This conception neglects the transcendent dimension of human nature, the spiritual yearnings that constitute the deepest stratum of human identity, and the ultimate orientation of human existence toward the Divine. The Islamic concept of fiṭrah distinguishes between the merely biological drive toward growth and the authentic spiritual orientation toward God, affirming that true human perfection consists in the full actualization of the God-given spiritual potentialities that elevate the human being beyond the purely natural order.
Third, the critique of absolute autonomy and the denial of divine relationality: Rogers' emphasis on human self-grounding and autonomy reflects a fundamental denial of the relational constitution of human identity, particularly the essential relation of the human being to God. In Islamic anthropology, the human being is not an autonomous, self-grounding entity but a servant ('abd) of God, whose perfection consists in the conscious, chosen realization of this servitude. True freedom is not freedom from any external constraint or value but freedom from lower attachments and the willful, voluntary commitment to divine submission. Rogers' rejection of all external authority, including religious and moral guidance, represents not authentic freedom but a form of rebellion against the very structure of human existence, a denial of the created nature of the human being and the dependence of the creature upon the Creator.
Fourth, the critique of the organismic valuing process as an inadequate moral guide: Rogers' reliance on the organismic valuing process fails to provide any mechanism for resolving genuine moral conflicts, prioritizing competing goods, or regulating the tension between individual self-actualization and the legitimate rights and needs of others. When two individuals' self-actualization goals conflict, or when an individual's self-actualization path imposes unjust harm on others, the organismic valuing process offers no resources for adjudicating the dispute or establishing priorities. The Islamic alternative, grounded in objective moral principles, universal ethical norms, and the comprehensive guidance of revelation, provides a robust framework for resolving moral conflicts and establishing just social order.
Fifth, the critique of situation ethics and the absence of a stable moral framework: Rogers' ethics, by its very nature, is situational, fluid, and context-dependent, lacking any fixed moral principles that could serve as stable guides for action across varying circumstances. The Islamic alternative, while recognizing the legitimate contextual variability of some ethical judgments, affirms the existence of objective moral principles and stable virtues that transcend situational variation. Principles such as justice, truthfulness, trustworthiness, compassion, and modesty are recognized as inherently good regardless of subjective experience, and vices such as oppression, deceit, betrayal, and cruelty are recognized as inherently evil regardless of individual preference.
Practical Implications for Psychotherapy and Counseling
The ethical divergence between Rogers' and Misbah Yazdi's frameworks translates into fundamentally different approaches to psychotherapy, with significant practical implications. In the Rogers framework, the goal of therapy is secular self-actualization, characterized by the congruence between self-concept, organismic experience, and behavior, with psychological health defined as this integration. The therapist's role is non-judgmental empathic reflection, establishing a safe space for clients to explore their experiences and arrive at their own decisions free from external guidance. The process focuses on the present moment and the client's lived experience, with the therapist refraining from any moral direction or value imposition beyond what the client autonomously chooses.
In the Islamic faith-based therapeutic framework, by contrast, the ultimate goal is the realization of divine fiṭrah and spiritual proximity to God, with psychological health understood as the harmony between individual life and divine purposes, expressed through fulfillment of religious obligations and cultivation of moral virtues. The therapist serves as a spiritual and moral guide (muršid), drawing upon both professional psychological knowledge and religious expertise to help clients recognize deviation from their authentic fiṭrah and return to the path of spiritual growth. The therapeutic process integrates the material and spiritual dimensions of human existence, providing moral guidance grounded in Islamic teachings and offering meaningful frameworks for understanding suffering and pursuing healing. The therapist provides gentle, non-coercive ethical reminders when clients' actions conflict with Islamic values, helping clients explore the spiritual consequences of their choices and the alternative paths available within the religious tradition.

Conclusion
This research has examined and critiqued the ethical foundations of Carl Rogers' client-centered theory from the perspective of Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi's Islamic ethical framework. The analysis reveals fundamental and irreconcilable tensions between the two frameworks across multiple dimensions. Rogers' commitment to the absolute authority of subjective experience, organismic self-regulation, self-actualization as the ultimate human goal, unconditional positive regard, and human autonomy as self-grounding stands in direct conflict with the Islamic commitments to moral realism, divine fiṭrah, proximity to God as the human telos, the integral relationship between reason and revelation, and the radical relationality of human existence to God.
The critique demonstrates that Rogers' framework, despite its valuable contributions to establishing a positive therapeutic relationship characterized by empathy, respect, and non-judgmental acceptance, suffers from fundamental philosophical weaknesses. Its moral relativism undermines the possibility of meaningful ethical discourse, its naturalistic reductionism neglects the transcendent spiritual dimension of human existence, its denial of divine relationality misunderstands the essential structure of human identity, and its lack of stable moral principles fails to provide adequate guidance for resolving moral conflicts or establishing just social relations.
The Islamic ethical framework, as articulated by Misbah Yazdi, offers a more comprehensive and robust foundation for understanding human flourishing, therapeutic practice, and the ethical life. By integrating rational reflection with revelatory guidance, affirming the objective truth of moral principles, grounding ethics in the divine fiṭrah, and orienting human existence toward ultimate spiritual perfection, this framework provides both a profound critique of secular humanistic ethics and a constructive alternative for developing culturally appropriate and ethically sound approaches to psychotherapy in Islamic contexts.
The practical implications of this philosophical analysis suggest that contemporary counseling practice in Muslim societies would benefit from integrating the therapeutic techniques of Rogers (empathy, unconditional positive regard, active listening) within an Islamic ethical framework that provides clear moral guidance, spiritual direction, and meaningful teleological orientation. This integrative approach would preserve the positive relational contributions of person-centered therapy while overcoming its philosophical limitations through an Islamic framework that recognizes both human dignity and human dependence upon divine guidance. Future research should explore this integration further through empirical studies examining the effectiveness of Islamic faith-based counseling approaches, comparative investigations of other Western therapeutic models from Islamic perspectives, and the development of practical training models for ethically-grounded, culturally-appropriate mental health practice in Muslim communities.