Abstract
The issue of the existence of a relationship is one of the important issues in Islamic philosophy, which has been the focus of discussion among Islamic scholars, especially since the time of Mulla Sadra Shirazi. Mulla Sadra, by precisely defining the existence of the relation and also stating the characteristics of the existence of the relation of the effect and the consequences of accepting them, opened a new chapter on the truth of the existence of the effect; to the extent that all philosophers after him commented on his view. One of these philosophers is Allameh Tabataba'i, who, like Mulla Sadra, has addressed this issue with particular care and has enumerated specific characteristics for the existence of the relation. This article uses an analytical method and a comparative approach to explain the views of Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabataba'i on the issue of the existence of a causal relationship and a comparative study between them, and explains the similarities and differences between these two thinkers, and finally evaluates their views. These two philosophers share the same view of the existence of the affected, but they do not understand the independence of the existence of the affected relation, the lack of essence, and the acceptance of the personal unity of existence through the problem of the existence of the relation. They also differ in whether the existence of the affected relation has one status or two statuses, the specific difference or lack of specific difference between independent and relational existence, the reality of the division of existence into independent and relational, the verbal or spiritual commonality of the application of existence to relational and independent, and also in the definition of relational existence. These issues will be evaluated in the final section of the article. Therefore, the main question of the following article is how to reconcile the views of Mulla Sadra and Allama Tabataba'i on the issue of the existence of a disabled link.

Introduction
The problem of "relational existence" (al-wujūd al-rābiṭ) stands as one of the most significant and enduring questions in Islamic philosophy, having occupied a central place in metaphysical discourse particularly since the time of Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (d. 1635). With his precise definition of relational existence and his articulation of its distinctive characteristics and philosophical implications, Ṣadrā opened a new chapter in understanding the nature of created existence, influencing virtually all subsequent philosophers in the Islamic tradition. His doctrine that contingent beings possess a "relational" rather than "independent" mode of existence fundamentally transformed the way philosophers conceptualized the relationship between the Creator and creation, leading to profound consequences for ontology, epistemology, and theology.
Mullā Ṣadrā's innovation lay in his rejection of the prevailing view among earlier philosophers that contingent beings possess two aspects: a "self-oriented" aspect (ḥaythiyya fī nafsihā) pertaining to their quiddity, and an "other-oriented" aspect (ḥaythiyya li-ghayrihā) pertaining to their existence. Instead, Ṣadrā argued that the very existence of contingent beings is nothing but relation and dependence upon their cause; they possess no self-subsistent reality whatsoever. This radical re-conceptualization led him to affirm that all created existents are "relational" (rābiṭ) rather than merely "relative" (rābiṭī), and that true independent existence belongs exclusively to God. From this foundation, Ṣadrā developed his famous doctrine of the personal unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd al-shakhṣiyya), according to which there is only one single reality in existence, and all other things are relations, manifestations, and aspects of that one reality.
Among the philosophers who critically engaged with Ṣadrā's doctrine and developed their own distinctive positions on this question was Allameh Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī (d. 1981), one of the most influential Islamic philosophers of the twentieth century. While Ṭabāṭabā'ī accepted the fundamental insight that contingent beings are relational in their existence, he disagreed with certain aspects of Ṣadrā's formulation and proposed modifications that had significant philosophical consequences. His nuanced treatment of the question, particularly his distinction between two aspects of relational existence, represents an important development in the Sadrian tradition.
The present study undertakes a comparative investigation of the two philosophers' doctrines concerning relational existence, aiming to clarify both the points of agreement and the points of divergence between them. The central research question asks: How can the theories of Mullā Ṣadrā and Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī concerning relational existence be compared and contrasted, and what are the philosophical implications of their respective positions? By examining their definitions, the characteristics they attribute to relational existence, and the consequences they derive from this doctrine, this study seeks to illuminate the distinctive contributions of each thinker and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. The significance of this comparative study lies not only in its contribution to understanding these two major figures but also in its potential to deepen our understanding of the broader metaphysical issues concerning the nature of existence, causality, and the relationship between the finite and the infinite.

Research Methodology
This research employs an analytical and comparative methodology to examine and evaluate the doctrines of Mullā Ṣadrā and Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī concerning relational existence. The study proceeds through four main phases: (1) systematic exposition of Ṣadrā's doctrine, including his definitions of relational existence and the characteristics he attributes to it; (2) systematic exposition of Ṭabāṭabā'ī's doctrine, including his definitions, characteristics, and distinctive contributions; (3) comparative analysis identifying points of agreement and divergence between the two philosophers; and (4) critical evaluation of both theories, assessing their philosophical strengths and weaknesses.
The research draws upon primary sources from both philosophers. For Ṣadrā, the study relies on his magnum opus Al-Ḥikma al-Muta'āliya fī al-Asfār al-'Aqliyya al-Arba'a (The Transcendent Philosophy in the Four Intellectual Journeys), as well as his other major works including Al-Mabda' wa al-Ma'ād (The Origin and the Return), Al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyya (The Lordly Witnesses), and Al-Mashā'ir (The Metaphysical Penetrations). For Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the study examines his philosophical works including Bidāyat al-Ḥikma (The Beginning of Wisdom), Nihāyat al-Ḥikma (The End of Wisdom), his glosses on philosophical texts, and his exegetical work Al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān. Secondary sources, including commentaries and critical studies, are consulted for clarification and contextualization.
The comparative framework is organized around key thematic dimensions: (1) the definition of relational existence and the distinction between different senses of "relation"; (2) the ontological status of relational existence and its characteristics; (3) the question of whether relational existence possesses a "self-aspect" (ḥaythiyya fī nafsihā) or only an "other-aspect" (ḥaythiyya li-ghayrihā); (4) the issue of whether independent and relational existence differ in kind (type) or only in degree; (5) the question of whether the term "existence" is applied to independent and relational existence univocally or equivocally; and (6) the implications of the doctrine for the theory of the personal unity of existence. The analysis proceeds through careful textual examination, conceptual clarification, logical evaluation, and critical assessment of philosophical arguments.

Discussion
Mullā Ṣadrā's Doctrine of Relational Existence
Mullā Ṣadrā devotes a separate chapter in the Asfār to defining relational existence and its characteristics, offering three distinct definitions that correspond to three senses of "relation" in his philosophical terminology. The first definition pertains to the mental order: relational existence is a mode of existence that cannot be conceived independently but only in conjunction with an independent concept; this is what Ṣadrā calls the "prepositional meaning" (ma'nā ḥarfī), as opposed to the "nominal meaning" (ma'nā ismī). In this sense, relational existence corresponds to the role of prepositions in language—concepts that have no independent meaning but function as connectors between other concepts. Ṣadrā emphasizes that this division pertains to conceptual existence in the mind, not to external reality, and that independent and relational existence in this sense differ in kind and share only the name.
The second definition addresses the level of conceptual existence but with reference to external reality: relational existence (al-wujūd al-rābiṭī) is existence that, although possessing an independent concept in the mind, serves as a description and attribute of something else in external reality. Ṣadrā calls this "existence in itself but for another" (wujūd fī nafsihi li-ghayrihi). This sense applies to accidents and qualities that, while conceptually independent as universal notions, in external reality are attributes of substances. In this sense, relational existence is a species of independent existence rather than its opposite, and it is compatible with the first sense of independent existence.
The third definition pertains strictly to external reality: relational existence (al-wujūd al-rābiṭ) is existence that is pure relation and dependence upon another, lacking any self-aspect or independent reality. This is the definition that Ṣadrā applies to contingent existence as such. According to this view, contingent beings do not possess any reality of their own; their entire reality consists of relation to and dependence upon their cause. This is what Ṣadrā means when he says that contingent existence is "being through another" (wujūd fī ghayrihi) rather than "existence in itself" (wujūd fī nafsihi). To distinguish this sense from the second, Ṣadrā calls the second "relative existence" (rābiṭī) and the third "relational existence" (rābiṭ).
The characteristics Ṣadrā attributes to relational existence in this third sense are far-reaching in their implications. First, relational existence possesses no "self-aspect" (ḥaythiyya fī nafsihā); its entire identity is its "other-aspect" (ḥaythiyya li-ghayrihā), pure relation and dependence upon its cause. Second, because it lacks any self-aspect, relational existence does not constitute a reality alongside other realities; it cannot be counted as an independent entity in the inventory of existence. It is not a second reality parallel to the reality of its cause but rather a manifestation and aspect of the cause itself. Third, relational existence is not a separate existence alongside its cause; it is a relation of one existence—the existence of the cause—not existence itself; it is an effect of existence, not existence proper.
Fourth, because relational existence lacks any self-identity, it cannot be subject to any judgment or proposition; the attribution of existence to it is not strictly correct. Fifth, relational existence cannot be independently perceived; the perception—whether conceptual or intuitive—of relational existence is actually the perception of the cause in its manifested mode. This means that when we perceive contingent beings, we are in reality perceiving the cause at a particular level of manifestation, not a separate independent reality. Sixth, Ṣadrā's denial of independent existence to contingent beings does not entail nihilism; rather, he affirms that contingent beings are manifestations and aspects of God, and he accepts their multiplicity as multiplicity in manifestations, not multiplicity in existences. There is a single existence that manifests itself in diverse modes and levels.
Finally, Ṣadrā draws the crucial conclusion that from the doctrine of relational existence follows the theory of the personal unity of existence: there is only one personal existent in the universe, and everything else is its relations, aspects, and manifestations. This conclusion represents the crowning achievement of Ṣadrā's metaphysical system, synthesizing his earlier arguments for the principiality of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), the gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), and the relational nature of contingent existence.
Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī's Doctrine of Relational Existence
Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī, while deeply influenced by Ṣadrā's metaphysical insights, developed his own distinctive formulation of the doctrine of relational existence. He defines relational existence as "existence in another" (wujūd fī ghayrihi)—existence that lacks any independent self-hood and is pure relation and dependence upon another existent. Like Ṣadrā, Ṭabāṭabā'ī emphasizes that relational existence has no self-aspect, no reality independent of its cause, and cannot be counted as a separate reality alongside other realities.
However, Ṭabāṭabā'ī's formulation differs from Ṣadrā's in several important respects. First, Ṭabāṭabā'ī explicitly distinguishes between the concept (mafhūm) of existence and the external reality (miṣdāq) of existence. The concept of existence, as such, is neutral with respect to independence and relation; it takes on these determinations only through its external instantiation. Thus, the division of existence into independent and relational is a division pertaining to external reality, not to conceptual meaning. A concept is independent or relational only because it derives from an independent or relational external existent. This subtle but crucial point enables Ṭabāṭabā'ī to affirm that the same concept of existence can be applied to both independent and relational existents, provided that the external existents share in the reality of existence.
Second, Ṭabāṭabā'ī distinguishes three applications of the term "relational existence": (1) relational existence in propositions (as a copula or connective); (2) relational existence of contingent beings (their dependence upon their cause); and (3) relational existence among relative categories. According to Ṭabāṭabā'ī, all three are instances of a single meaning of "relation"—a relation of dependence and connection—and thus share the same conceptual nature.
Third, and most significantly, Ṭabāṭabā'ī differs from Ṣadrā in his treatment of the question of whether relational existence possesses a self-aspect. While Ṣadrā emphatically denies any self-aspect to relational existence, Ṭabāṭabā'ī affirms that contingent existence possesses two aspects: a relational aspect and an independent aspect. According to Ṭabāṭabā'ī, when we consider a contingent being in relation to its cause, it is pure relation and dependence—this is its "relational aspect." However, when we consider the same being in itself and in comparison with other creatures, it possesses a kind of independence and can be treated as a distinct entity—this is its "independent aspect."
These two aspects, for Ṭabāṭabā'ī, are not merely conceptual or conventional; they are real aspects of the external existent itself. A contingent being is not simply relational and nothing else; rather, it possesses a dual character: relationally dependent upon its cause, but possessing a certain self-identity in relation to other creatures. This means that the same external reality can serve as both a relational and an independent term, depending on the perspective from which it is considered.
The implications of this position are far-reaching. Because relational existence possesses an independent aspect, it can be conceived independently; that is, it can function as the subject of a concept and as a term in judgments and propositions. Moreover, because the same reality can be considered relationally or independently, the application of the concept of existence to both independent and relational existents is not equivocal but univocal; they share in the same meaning of existence, though they instantiate it in different modes. Thus, Ṭabāṭabā'ī affirms that existence is applied to independent and relational existents with univocal meaning (ishtirāk ma'nawī), in contrast to Ṣadrā's apparent affirmation of equivocal meaning (ishtirāk lafẓī).
Comparative Analysis: Agreement and Disagreement
The comparative analysis reveals six significant points of agreement between Ṣadrā and Ṭabāṭabā'ī. First, both philosophers affirm that contingent existence is relational rather than independent; its nature is pure relation and dependence upon its cause, lacking any self-subsistence. Second, both hold that relational existence has no "self-aspect" in the sense of possessing an independent self-hood; its identity is its relation to and dependence upon its cause. Third, both affirm that relational existence is an aspect or manifestation of its cause, not a separate reality alongside it. Fourth, both hold that the perception of relational existence is only possible through the perception of its cause; independent perception of relational existence is impossible. Fifth, both hold that relational existence lacks quiddity (māhiyya)—or at least that it cannot be defined in terms of quiddity in the same way as independent existence. Sixth, both derive from the relational nature of contingent existence the conclusion that there is a personal unity of existence: only one independent reality exists, and all else is relation, manifestation, and aspect of that reality.
The analysis also reveals five significant points of disagreement. First, regarding the aspects of relational existence, Ṣadrā holds that relational existence possesses only one aspect—the relational aspect—and completely lacks any self-aspect. Ṭabāṭabā'ī, by contrast, affirms that relational existence possesses two real aspects: a relational aspect (when considered in relation to its cause) and an independent aspect (when considered in itself). Second, regarding the question of whether independent and relational existence differ in kind, Ṣadrā affirms a difference in kind (type)—they share only the name of existence and do not participate in a common meaning. Ṭabāṭabā'ī denies any difference in kind; the difference is one of mode or aspect, not of type.
Third, regarding the division of existence into independent and relational, Ṣadrā denies that this is a genuine division because the divisions of a concept must be mutually exclusive, whereas relational existence is not independent of independent existence but a relation to it. Ṭabāṭabā'ī, by contrast, affirms that this is a genuine division because independent and relational existence are distinct modes of the same reality. Fourth, regarding the application of the term "existence" to independent and relational existence, Ṣadrā holds that it is equivocal (since independent and relational existence differ in kind), whereas Ṭabāṭabā'ī holds that it is univocal (since they share in the same meaning of existence). Fifth, regarding the definition of relational existence, Ṣadrā offers three distinct definitions corresponding to three senses of relation, while Ṭabāṭabā'ī offers a single definition with three applications.
Critical Evaluation
The critical evaluation of the two philosophers' doctrines yields several important insights. First, the argument that relational existence leads to the personal unity of existence requires careful scrutiny. The claim that contingent beings are relational establishes only that they are pure relation to and dependence upon their cause; it does not establish that they have no independent existence whatsoever. The term "relational existence" can mean either (a) existence that is relation (as a prepositional meaning, with no independent existence) or (b) the relation of one existent to another (as a nominal meaning, existing as an attribute of both terms). Ṣadrā's argument for the personal unity of existence relies on the first meaning, but what his proof actually establishes is only the second—namely, that contingent beings are essentially related to their cause. It does not follow from this that contingent beings have no reality whatsoever; they may possess their own reality while being essentially related to the cause. Thus, the argument does not establish the personal unity of existence but only the essential relationality of created beings to their Creator.
Second, the claim that all contingent beings are relational is problematic. Contingent beings can be categorized into three types: (1) existence in itself for itself (wujūd fī nafsihi li-nafsihi), such as the intellects; (2) existence in itself for another (wujūd fī nafsihi li-ghayrihi), such as accidents and qualities; and (3) existence in another or relational existence (wujūd fī ghayrihi or rābiṭ), such as the relationship between a book and a table. Each of these three types is contingent and essentially related to God, but only the third is relational in the sense of being pure relation. To claim that all three are relational is to conflate essential relationality (being contingent and dependent) with being pure relation. This represents a confusion between ontological dependence and relational mode of existence.
Third, regarding the disagreement about whether independent and relational existence differ in kind, the evaluation favors Ṭabāṭabā'ī's position. Relational existence can be conceived both prepositionally (with a non-independent concept) and nominally (with an independent concept). The concept "relation" (nisba) or "relational existence" (wujūd rābiṭ) is itself a nominal, independent concept that refers to relational existence. Thus, the same reality of relational existence can be signified by both prepositional and nominal concepts. This does not require first positing independence for relational existence; rather, the nominal concept directly signifies relational existence as a relation, without any prior assumption of independence. Therefore, independent and relational existence do not differ in kind; they are distinct modes of the same reality.
Fourth, the claim that relational existence lacks quiddity is problematic. If, as argued above, relational existence can be signified by a nominal concept, then it possesses quiddity—the "whatness" of relation. This quiddity is distinct from the quiddity of independent existence, but it is nevertheless a quiddity proper to relational existence. To deny quiddity to relational existence would be to eliminate all quiddity from the created world, since all created beings are relational. Yet quiddity clearly applies to creatures in their mode of being.
Fifth, the claim that relational existence cannot be the subject of judgments is likewise problematic. If relational existence possesses quiddity and can be signified by nominal concepts, then it can function as the subject or predicate of propositions. Relations, properties, and aspects of things are clearly objects of thought and discourse, and they can be affirmed or denied of things. Thus, relational existence can indeed be subject to judgments and can be the subject or predicate of propositions.

Conclusion
This comparative study has examined the doctrines of Mullā Ṣadrā and Allameh Ṭabāṭabā'ī concerning relational existence, revealing both significant points of agreement and important points of divergence. The six points of agreement demonstrate that both philosophers share a fundamental commitment to the relational nature of contingent existence, its dependence upon its cause, its status as an aspect of the cause, the impossibility of its independent perception, its lack of quiddity, and the implication of this doctrine for the theory of the unity of existence. These shared commitments reflect the deep continuity of the Sadrian metaphysical tradition and the centrality of the concept of relational existence in shaping subsequent Islamic philosophy.
The five points of divergence reveal important differences in how these two philosophers conceptualize the nature of relational existence, its relation to independent existence, and the implications of this doctrine. Ṣadrā's position is more radical in denying any self-aspect to relational existence, affirming a difference in kind between independent and relational existence, denying the genuineness of the division between them, affirming the equivocal application of the term "existence," and offering multiple definitions of relational existence. Ṭabāṭabā'ī's position is more nuanced in affirming the duality of aspects in relational existence, denying the difference in kind, affirming the genuineness of the division, affirming the univocal application of "existence," and offering a single definition with multiple applications.
The critical evaluation suggests that Ṭabāṭabā'ī's formulation addresses certain difficulties in Ṣadrā's position. The claim that relational existence leads to the personal unity of existence requires further support; what the argument establishes is essential relationality, not the denial of any independent existence to creatures. The claim that all contingent beings are relational conflates essential relationality with being pure relation; a distinction must be made between the three modes of contingent existence. The affirmative position that independent and relational existence differ in kind is rejected in favor of Ṭabāṭabā'ī's position that they differ in mode; a nominal concept can directly signify relational existence without prior assumption of independence. Consequently, relational existence does possess quiddity and can function as the subject of judgments.
The study thus demonstrates the philosophical richness and ongoing development of the Sadrian tradition, showing how Ṭabāṭabā'ī critically engaged with Ṣadrā's insights, refined them, and developed a more nuanced formulation that addressed certain difficulties while preserving the core commitments of the tradition. This comparative analysis contributes to a deeper understanding of both philosophers and to the broader metaphysical question of the nature of created existence and its relationship to the Divine.