The late Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, through his distinctive interpretation of the term Jadaliyyat al‑Tarafayn employed by Mīr Dāmād in the context of the debate on the temporal origination or eternity of the world (ḥudūth vs. qidam al-ʿālam), sought to establish a parallel between this term and Kant’s notion of Antinomy as developed in the “Transcendental Dialectic” section of the Critique of Pure Reason. Although both philosophers address the problematic nature of the world’s temporality, the meaning, scope, and motives underlying these two concepts—as well as the respective strategies of Mīr Dāmād and Kant in confronting such epistemic impasses—differ fundamentally. Thus, equating the two appears to be a highly problematic and ultimately untenable endeavor. This article critically examines Haeri Yazdi’s claim by comparing Kant’s and Mīr Dāmād’s treatments of the issue of the world’s creation or eternity, and concludes by proposing alternative renderings of the Kantian Antinomy within the context of Islamic philosophical terminology. The analysis suggests that the term shukūk (“doubts” or “skeptical oppositions”) may serve as a more accurate and philosophically consistent translation of Antinomy in Kant’s philosophy.