Supervenience in ethics represents a co-variance relationship between moral properties and descriptive properties, which explains certain axes in meta-ethics, including the ontological dimension of moral phenomena. In contrast, the theory of conventional good and bad is a viewpoint with traditional literature, addressing the ontology of good and bad, or more precisely, general moral concepts, where the horizon of good and bad is seen in the broader social interests. It is under the shadow of these social goals that good and bad are given concreteness.
In this article, through analytical, methodological, and comparative readings of both theories, two capacities in moral supervenience are identified, for which the theory of conventional good and bad potentially offers answers. If conventional good and bad are revisited and framed within the axis of moral supervenience discussions, they could constitute one of the fundamental readings of supervenience. Initially, according to the perspective of conventional good and bad, those descriptive details that in supervenience form a co-variance relationship with moral details are social goals and interests.
Additionally, the concept of modality, which forms the basis for dividing types of supervenience in ethics, can be explained as a continuum within the framework of conventional good and bad.