Abstract
The discussion of the realms of existence has long shaped philosophical inquiry. Mullā Ṣadrā correlated the levels of being with the three modes of human cognition and, through his innovative defense of the connected imaginal realm, introduced a significant transformation in Islamic philosophy and offered new perspectives on issues such as bodily resurrection. Price, in a different context, arrived at the notion of an imaginal world through his examination of documented parapsychological evidence, a view that eventually attracted considerable philosophical attention. This study, using library-based research and a comparative method, investigates how Ṣadrā and Price conceive the relationship between the imaginal world and human immortality. Their accounts display notable similarities, including the comparison of postmortem life to dreaming, the central role of the imaginative faculty, and the idea of an imaginal or “image-body” as the vehicle of posthumous experience. However, meaningful differences also emerge, rooted in their distinct philosophical commitments and methods of reasoning. Ṣadrā, drawing on his ontological framework and the graded structure of existence, argues for immortality through the immateriality of the imaginal realm, whereas Price relies on philosophical psychology and the phenomenological analysis of mental experiences, supported by parapsychological observations. The study’s contribution lies in presenting a coherent comparative interpretation of Ṣadrā’s and Price’s views on immortality, the mode of awakening in the imaginal world, and the conditions shaping a desirable postmortem existence.

Introduction
The question of life after death and the immortality of the human soul has occupied a central place in religious, philosophical, and mystical traditions throughout history. Across cultures, philosophers have sought to explain the nature of postmortem existence and the conditions under which personal identity survives bodily death. These investigations are not merely speculative; they also shape ethical life by linking human actions, virtues, and intellectual development to the destiny of the soul. Despite the extensive literature on immortality, little attention has been devoted to a systematic comparison of Mullā Ṣadrā's metaphysical theory of the imaginal realm with H. H. Price's philosophical account of the postmortem world. This study addresses that gap by examining the role of imagination in explaining survival after death and the continuity of personal identity.
Mullā Ṣadrā (1571–1640), the founder of the Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah), developed one of the most sophisticated theories of the imaginal realm in Islamic philosophy. Grounded in the principles of the primacy of existence, substantial motion, and the immateriality of the imaginative faculty, his theory explains bodily resurrection through the formation of an imaginal body that preserves the soul's identity after death. H. H. Price (1899–1984), working within the analytic tradition, approached the same question from a markedly different perspective. Drawing on philosophical psychology and parapsychological evidence, he argued that postmortem existence unfolds in a world of mental images in which consciousness, memory, and personality continue independently of the physical body.
Although these philosophers differ substantially in their intellectual backgrounds and methods of inquiry, their accounts display striking convergences. Both regard the afterlife as an imaginal mode of existence, compare postmortem consciousness to dreaming, and maintain that an immaterial image-body serves as the vehicle of personal identity after death. At the same time, they diverge in the ontological status they assign to the imaginal realm and in the philosophical foundations upon which their theories rest. Whereas Mullā Ṣadrā develops a comprehensive metaphysical account of an objectively existing imaginal world, Price offers a phenomenological and psychological interpretation grounded in the continuity of conscious experience.
The originality of this study lies in demonstrating that these two seemingly unrelated traditions converge on a common philosophical insight: imagination is not merely a cognitive faculty but the medium through which postmortem existence becomes intelligible. By placing Mullā Ṣadrā's metaphysical framework in dialogue with Price's philosophy of survival, this study contributes to contemporary debates on immortality, consciousness, and the ontological significance of the imaginal realm, while illustrating the broader value of comparative philosophy in bridging Islamic and Western intellectual traditions.

Methodology
This study adopts a comparative-philosophical approach based on textual and conceptual analysis. Primary sources include Mullā Ṣadrā's major philosophical works—especially al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah, al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbiyyah, and his writings on psychology and eschatology—as well as H. H. Price's essays on survival and parapsychology, particularly those collected in Philosophical Interactions with Parapsychology (1995). These texts are supplemented by contemporary scholarship on Islamic philosophy, philosophy of mind, and comparative philosophy.
The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, each philosopher's account of the imaginal realm, the soul, postmortem existence, and personal identity is reconstructed within its own intellectual context. Second, their views are systematically compared with respect to four principal themes: the ontological status of the imaginal realm, the role of imagination in survival after death, the nature of the postmortem body, and the continuity of personal identity. Finally, the study evaluates the philosophical significance of their convergences and divergences, demonstrating how these two traditions offer complementary perspectives on immortality and consciousness.

Discussion
Mullā Ṣadrā: The Imaginal Realm and the Immortality of the Soul
Mullā Ṣadrā's theory of the imaginal realm is embedded within his broader metaphysical system, in which existence unfolds through graded levels extending from the material world to the intelligible realm. Between these two domains lies the imaginal realm (ʿālam al-khayāl), an intermediate mode of being that is immaterial with respect to matter yet retains extension, form, and individuality. This ontological framework enables Mullā Ṣadrā to explain bodily resurrection without requiring the reconstitution of the physical body. Instead, the soul survives through an imaginal body generated by its own existential perfection and imaginative power.
Central to this account is the doctrine that the soul is bodily in its origin but spiritual in its subsistence (jismāniyyat al-ḥudūth wa rūḥāniyyat al-baqāʾ). Through substantial motion, the soul progressively acquires higher levels of existence, while the imaginative faculty develops into an independent and immaterial power capable of surviving bodily death. Consequently, death signifies not the destruction of consciousness but its transition into another mode of existence in which perception occurs directly through imagination rather than through the bodily senses.
Mullā Ṣadrā further maintains that personal identity is preserved because the imaginal body is a direct manifestation of the soul's acquired dispositions, beliefs, desires, and actions. The afterlife is therefore neither externally imposed nor arbitrarily determined; rather, it represents the objective manifestation of the individual's inner reality. Human beings effectively construct their postmortem world through their intellectual, moral, and spiritual development during earthly life. Souls that attain intellectual perfection ultimately transcend the imaginal realm and participate in the intelligible world, whereas others continue their existence within imaginal realities proportionate to their existential rank.
Accordingly, imagination occupies a dual role in Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy. It is both an epistemic faculty through which the soul apprehends non-sensible realities and an ontological power responsible for shaping the very form of postmortem existence. This integration of metaphysics, psychology, and eschatology distinguishes his theory from earlier Islamic accounts of resurrection and provides a coherent philosophical explanation of immortality.
H. H. Price: The World of Mental Images and Survival After Death
H. H. Price approaches the problem of immortality from a markedly different intellectual tradition. Rather than constructing a comprehensive metaphysical system, he investigates the possibility of survival after death through philosophical psychology and the critical examination of parapsychological evidence. Drawing particularly upon reports of mediumistic communication, Price argues that consciousness may continue independently of the physical organism within what he describes as a "world of mental images."
Price characterizes this postmortem world as dream-like rather than material. Just as dreams present coherent experiences without dependence upon external sensory objects, the afterlife consists of a reality generated through imagination while remaining experientially real for those who inhabit it. The transition from earthly life to this imaginal world therefore resembles awakening into a different mode of consciousness rather than entering a spatially distinct physical realm.
To account for personal identity, Price introduces the concept of the image-body, a non-material vehicle constituted by memory, personality, and self-consciousness rather than biological matter. Individual continuity depends not upon numerical bodily identity but upon the persistence of consciousness and psychological characteristics. Moreover, he suggests that postmortem existence may include semi-public imaginal environments in which individuals possessing sufficiently similar mental structures are capable of shared experience and telepathic interaction.
Although Price refrains from making strong metaphysical claims concerning the independent existence of the imaginal realm, his theory significantly expands philosophical discussions of survival by emphasizing imagination as the medium through which consciousness constructs postmortem experience. His account thus offers a phenomenological perspective that complements more traditional metaphysical theories of immortality.
Comparative Analysis: Convergence and Divergence
Despite the historical, methodological, and cultural distance separating Mullā Ṣadrā and H. H. Price, their theories exhibit remarkable philosophical convergences. Both reject the reduction of human existence to material embodiment and maintain that consciousness survives death through an imaginal mode of existence. Both compare postmortem life to dreaming, arguing that the imagination functions as the principal medium through which the soul experiences reality after bodily death. Likewise, both affirm the existence of a non-material body that preserves personal identity and serves as the vehicle of postmortem experience. In both accounts, the quality of life after death reflects the individual's acquired dispositions, beliefs, and actions rather than merely external reward or punishment.
These similarities, however, conceal significant philosophical differences. The most fundamental concerns the ontological status of the imaginal realm. For Mullā Ṣadrā, the imaginal world constitutes an objective level of reality situated between the material and intelligible worlds and grounded in a comprehensive metaphysical system. Price, by contrast, interprets the postmortem world primarily as a psychological and phenomenological domain generated through mental imagery and sustained by the continuity of consciousness. Consequently, Mullā Ṣadrā explains survival through an ontology of existence, whereas Price explains it through a philosophy of mind informed by empirical and parapsychological considerations.
A second difference concerns interpersonal existence after death. Price proposes the possibility of shared or semi-public imaginal worlds in which individuals possessing compatible mental structures may interact telepathically. Mullā Ṣadrā, however, emphasizes that each soul inhabits an imaginal world proportionate to its existential perfection, making postmortem experience fundamentally individualized. Furthermore, Mullā Ṣadrā integrates resurrection into the broader metaphysical process of substantial motion, while Price restricts his discussion to the transition from bodily to imaginal existence. These differences reflect two distinct philosophical traditions: one grounded in metaphysical realism and the other in philosophical psychology.
Rather than viewing these perspectives as mutually exclusive, this study argues that they are philosophically complementary. Mullā Ṣadrā offers an ontological foundation capable of explaining why the imaginal realm exists, whereas Price provides a phenomenological account of how such a realm may be experienced. Their dialogue therefore enriches contemporary discussions concerning consciousness, imagination, and the possibility of survival after death.

Conclusion
This comparative investigation demonstrates that Mullā Ṣadrā and H. H. Price, despite belonging to different philosophical traditions, converge on several fundamental insights concerning immortality. Both regard the imagination as indispensable to postmortem existence, affirm the persistence of personal identity beyond bodily death, and describe the afterlife as an imaginal mode of consciousness rather than a merely physical continuation of earthly existence. The analogy between dreaming and the afterlife, together with the concept of an immaterial image-body, constitutes one of the most significant points of convergence between their theories.
Nevertheless, their explanations rest upon markedly different philosophical foundations. Mullā Ṣadrā develops a comprehensive metaphysical account rooted in the ontology of existence and substantial motion, whereas Price advances a psychological and phenomenological interpretation informed by empirical discussions of survival and parapsychology. These differences illustrate not only the diversity of approaches to immortality but also the possibility of productive dialogue between Islamic metaphysics and contemporary philosophy of mind.
The principal contribution of this study is to show that these perspectives should not be understood as competing explanations but as complementary models that illuminate different dimensions of postmortem existence. By integrating metaphysical analysis with phenomenological reflection, the comparison provides a richer account of the imaginal realm and highlights the enduring philosophical significance of imagination for understanding consciousness, personal identity, and human immortality. This comparative framework also demonstrates the continuing relevance of Islamic philosophy to contemporary debates in philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and comparative philosophy.